Archive for Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts

NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach

February 18, 2013 International Relations, Paid Content, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

“NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW  to follow. Includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,821 words, 22 pages double-spaced, 60 references

Section One – NATO – Brief History and Background

Pre Cold War.  Hoehn and Harting note that increasing tensions with the Soviet Union over its Berlin Blockade (1948), China’s “short-lived embrace of Moscow” (5), and Communist incursions in Czechoslovakia and Korea led the United States, Canada and ten other Western European states to form NATO as a defensive alliance and formulate a policy of Soviet “containment” designed to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” in April of 1949 (8). Despite occasional disagreements over burden-sharing and a dust-up with France, alliance members “deterred the Soviets, and integrated Germany into a collective defense system for the West” over the next 40 years (Duignan 43), moving from a posture of deterrence to détente in a manner consistent with its values of “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO “Treaty”).

Post Cold War. NATO’s success with facilitating European integration and deterring the Soviet threat was rewarded with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in 1991 (Medcalf 196-197), as NATO “found itself without an enemy” for the first time in its history, earning a “bloodless victory … without firing a shot” (Duignan 46, 48). The collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged NATO to enlarge its membership into Eastern Europe (1999) and launch the Partnership for Peace (PfP) for military cooperation and dialogue with non-NATO states (1994) despite lingering doubts regarding NATO’s post-Cold War purpose and identity (Duignan 58). Read more

Strengths and Weaknesses of Truth Commissions vs. Amnesty Laws as States Recover from the Atrocities of War

February 18, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. 2011. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins.  FREE CONTENT

Truth Commissions (TCs) – TCs may be appointed or sponsored by national, international, NGO, or hybrid commissions (Bercovitch & Jackson 156). The strengths of truth commissions may include their low cost, flexibility, “wide range of purposes” that they serve, ability to “reconstitute the moral order and provide a measure of justice when trials are not an option,” usefulness in dealing with “disappearances and killings by anonymous death squads,” potential to end a culture of impunity, role in providing a new transitional government “room to maneuver,” and the “emotional therapy” they provide a “traumatized society” (Bercovitch & Jackson 159). But are TCs ‘compromise justice’ that actually weaken the ability to make peace?

Hayner’s analysis of 15 recent TCs is useful for delineating their strengths and weaknesses. Hayner notes that in Uganda (1974) the TC had “little impact on the practices of the Amin regime” (612); in Bolivia many abuses “were overlooked” (614); the Uruguay TC was “not a serious undertaking of human rights” (616); the Zimbabwe report “has never been available to the public” (617); the Chilean report resulted in a formal apology by the President and many recommendations being implemented (622). Furthermore, the Chad TC may have been established “to improve the new president’s image” and suffered from lack of funds (624-625); the El Salvador TC resulted in general amnesty only five days after publication of its report (629); and the South African ANC II report denied any “systematic policy of abuse” (633). Read more

Do NGOs have a Place in Conflict Resolution? Are They Really Neutral? Are Military PRTs the Answer?

February 15, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. 2010. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. FREE CONTENT

NGOs are essential to conflict resolution in as much as they possess the necessary skills, knowledge, personnel and experience to help resolve the conflict and the context is favorable to their participation. Certainly, the traditional role of the NGO has changed in nature from one of purely humanitarian relief to one that includes the roles of civil society builder and peace broker. This role transformation challenges the NGO’s assertion of neutrality and inviolability. Pamela Aall lists certain conditions that must exist prior to NGO conflict resolution intervention, saying NGOs must have:

·   Knowledge of the country and the regional institutions involved (14)

·   Indigenous partners (14)

·   Good knowledge of conflict mediation skills (14)

·   Inherent understanding of the personal risks involved (14)

David Baharvar explains, “The basic mission of the major NGOs devoted to international ethnic conflict resolution is to transform the way that torn societies deal with a conflict and to improve the process of conciliation. Their efforts typically are focused on capacity-building: consultation, dialogue, and training in conflict resolution for people on all sides of an ethnic conflict” (2001).

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.  Read more

Using Economic and Military Tools in Conflict Prevention

February 15, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. 2010. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. FREE CONTENT

There’s a number of economic tools that may be effective in preventing conflict. Most seem to fall under good governance. The first one that comes to my mind is export diversity. If you depend on one item for 44% of your exports and that one item is a commodity as it is with Sierra Leone’s diamonds, your economy is extremely vulnerable to global price fluctuations in that commodity. A downward dip in prices can have a devastating effect when all your eggs are in one basket. If people have to be laid off or you have to cut their wages, then social dissent can escalate as a result.

The second item that comes to mind is avoiding growth without development. If a nation choose to ignore its infrastructure and social services at the expense of corruption and out-of-control government spending, or spending on things that do not have a long-term impact like million dollar conferences, then that nation will suffer the consequences in decreased foreign direct investment and increased social dissent.

The third economic tool I can think of is well-developed economic and market institutions that are capable of opening up the economy to increased trade.  Peter Sutherland adds that increased trade may “challenge domestic corruption, encourage competition, release entrepreneurialism, ensure affordable services, “provide cover for reformers”, increase foreign investment (examples: Saudi Arabia, Cambodia, China), and increase personal civil rights and freedoms by virtue of access to greater levels of information via the internet, cell phones, etc.” (2008).

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. Read more

Are Confidence Building Measures Effective in the Middle East?

February 15, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. 2010. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. FREE CONTENT

Diehl lays out five dimensions of peace building which are applicable to the situation in the sense that CBM’s can be a significant component of peace building activities.  Diehl’s dimensions are (1) the goal; (2) the strategy and activities; (3) the timing; (4) the context; and (5) the actors who will bring it about (8-11).

Applying Diehl’s “broader context” we could also say that conflict resolution – the elimination of the “willingness of parties to use violence” (9) – is a fundamental goal to achieving a lasting, sustainable peace. The StimsonCenter specifies communication, constraint, transparency and verification measures as primary CBM tools that could conceivably be used within these five dimensons of peacebuilding (2010). Which ones would be feasible or effective? It depends on the peace building dimensions.

The context, goal and actors primarily drive the strategy. The timing is important but secondary given the length of this particular conflict. The context of Israel/Palestine situation differs significantly from the US/Russia Cold War example, while being more similar to the India/Pakistan example in some respects.

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. Read more

Zero Problems – Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia

February 14, 2013 International Relations, Paid Content, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts, Uncategorized No comments

“Zero Problems – Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

FREE PREVIEW

Zero Problems – Turkey – FREE PREVIEW

February 14, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

Zero Problems – Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia

{5,673 Words. 20 Pages. 61 References} 

FREE PREVIEW

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TOC)

I.     Section One – Europe and the Balkans

A.    European Union (EU) Accession

B.     Cooperation with NATO

C.     Cyprus and Greece Conflict

II.     Section Two – The Middle East            

A.    Israel

B.     Iran

C.     Syria

D.    Iraq

E.     Foreign Policy Perspective

III.   Section Three – Eurasia and the Caucasus

A.    Russia

B.     Armenia and Azerbaijan

IV.    Turkish Cooperation with the United States

V.      Turkey’s Domestic Issues

A.    The Kurdish Problem

B.     Political Trends, Islam and Social Transformation

C.     Comparisons with China

VI.    Conclusions: Conflict Prevention Through Strategic Counterbalancing

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.

Section One – Europe and the Balkans (*not the complete section*)

European Union (EU) Accession. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, says that EU Accession is on an “irreversible course” that will produce enhanced peace, stability, indivisibility of security, economic interdependence, cultural harmony and convergent interests in a region that includes the Balkans, the Caucasus, Europe and the Middle East (Davutoğlu:EU 12-17). The interests of the EU and Turkey do not, however, always converge harmoniously, and accession progress has slowed considerably since Brussels opened membership talks in 2005 with major regional security implications (Alessandri 28-29). Read more

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