Kapok Tree Diplomacy

Jeff Dwiggins – Kapok Tree Diplomacy – Feb. 2010 – All rights reserved.

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The dominant and mainstream theories of world politics explain both changes to the international system and the unique identities, interests and actions of its actors in context to the conditions of anarchy, rationality, the system’s particular structure, and the material capabilities or preferences of its actors. While realists, neorealists, liberals and neoliberals have their differences, they all explain structural transformation and state identity without appealing to social forces or domestic politics in a significant way.

Alexander Wendt’s theory of “social constructivism” and Robert Cox’s “historical materialism” provide alternative perspectives that assign greater importance to social forces which address the fundamental structure of the international system and their potential to shape the identities, interests and actions of actors.

How do these alternative theories redefine the international system and state identities and explain structural transformation? This essay will answer that question by analyzing the views of Wendt and Cox in detail, explaining how they differ from realist, neorealist and neoliberal views, and determining whether or not they improve upon those theories.  I will begin with Wendt’s theory of social constructivism.

Alexander Wendt – Social Constructivism

Main Views. Wendt (1995: 730) shares realist assumptions about anarchy, the survival motives and rationality of states, and the mistrust of other states’ intentions. He defines constructivism as “a structural theory of the international system” which designates states as “the principal units of analysis,” the key structures of the system as “intersubjective, rather than material,” and state interests and identities as being “constructed by these social structures, rather than given … by human nature or domestic politics” (Zehfuss 39). This converges with realism’s emphasis on states as main actors, but diverges on the components of intersubjective structures and socially constructed state identities and interests.

By including social structures, Wendt’s system architecture goes distinctly beyond the structure of neorealism in content and composition by adding another layer of structure. According to Wendt (1995: 730), social structures are “defined, in part, by shared understandings, expectations and knowledge” and paired with material capabilities and resources to form the basic foundation of the international system. “Material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt 1995: 730). Thus, Wendt is also going beyond the traditional realist and liberal views of power politics that self-help is the necessary response to anarchy by saying instead that “anarchy is what states make of it” (1992: 395).

Kenneth Waltz’s structure, comprised of the ordering principle of anarchy, the functionally undifferentiated character of states, and the material distribution of capabilities within the system (291-297), does not provide an adequate explanation on its own existence, according to Wendt (1995: 731), or the behavior of states within the system (1992: 396). Whether states interact as friends or foes, perceive their relationship in context to a security dilemma or security community, or utilize regimes and institutions instead of pursuing warfare or balancing strategies is predicated on the intersubjective shared knowledge, practices and process that have evolved over history (Wendt 1995: 731-735).  An illustration from poker may help explain this.

For Waltz, the structure is material in nature and exogenously deals the self-help hand of cards states must play with. For Wendt, state identities and interests are constituted by the system (1995: 730), not given to it, therefore one is not stuck with the inter-relational hand they’re dealt. A state can “discard” and improve their hand by attempting to transform the embedded social structure of interstate relations, thus solving conflicts as opposed to accepting or managing them (1995: 736).

Wendt consistently demonstrates how social forces generate international and institutional norms that “constrain what states and non-state actors do and influence their ideas of what is legitimate behavior” (Barnett 162). He also concludes that structure has a causal impact on behavior that leads not only to the diffusion and adoption of such norms, but may also reshape identities and interests as well, leading to greater levels of cooperation. (Wendt 1992: 417). “Over time, this will tend to transform a positive interdependence of outcomes into a positive interdependence of utilities or collective interest organized around the norms in question” (Wendt 1992: 417).

Wendt’s point is that behavior tied to identity is more predictable and flexible than behavior tied to the acquisition of power or relative gains. Thus, if the “consensus around identity commitments” can be broken and states are allowed to self-reflect on alternative pathways to problem resolution, the groundwork can be laid for a new inter-state social structure that reiterates and institutionalizes norms of cooperation, mutual respect and appropriate behavior (Wendt 1992: 420).

Wendt – Critical Evaluation. In his definition of social constructivism, Wendt specifically states that it is social structures that construct state identities not “human nature or domestic politics” (Zehfuss 39), obviously a slap at realism. The exemption of human nature is critically important. One must wonder how human nature is not intrinsically essential to social structures of shared knowledge, material resources and practices. Could Wendt say with confidence that Hitler would have changed course had he merely spent more time in self reflection? The heart bent on destruction is not so easily swayed.

It is certainly admirable to try and “change the structure of shared knowledge within anarchy” (Wendt 1995: 735), but additional knowledge does not always resolve conflict. I find it unrealistic to speak of social structures apart from human nature, when it is human nature that is a core foundation for such social structures in the first place. Moreover, what if a group developed a social structure around false knowledge or morally questionable practices? Wendt offers no barometer to judge whether a social structure is good or bad.

Wendt’s addition of social structures to the international system definition does build positively upon Waltz’s definition, by allowing one to go beyond a fixed set of choices and illuminating the critical role that social forces play in identity formation and state interests. To describe the status of world affairs in a purely material fashion, as neorealists do, where the arrangement of states and the distribution of their material capabilities is of primary importance leaves out very important information related to how state identities and interests may be influenced and even constituted by social forces and the system itself.

Neoliberals view institutions as material entities that provide a mechanism for greater cooperation and achieving absolute gains (Lamy 133). Wendt’s intersubjective (or immaterial) view of institutions goes beyond regimes, complex interdependence and economic goals, to assert the power of social forces to shape interests, identities and outcomes. Constructivism may provide the answer to inter-state interests that are not aligned to achieve meaningful cooperation. If one can change the interests, one can change the alignment. However, states may not desire that the group identity transcend their own.

Neoliberals may be underestimating the power of shared knowledge and culture to challenge and transform the anarchic system. By socially constructing alternatives through strategic inter-state interactions, constructivists may uncover some practical ways to enhance cooperation across a broader spectrum of ideas and goals, thereby reinforcing norms and regimes, strengthening linkage strategies and constituting new identities through the process.

Robert Cox – Historical Materialism

Main Views. Cox begins his essay on “Social Forces, States and World Orders” by asserting that his critical theory of world order sets forth a distinction between problem-solving and critical theory (753). He applies critical theory as a tool to examine how the current order came about and to “challenge the prevailing order by seeking out, analyzing, and, where possible, assisting social processes that can potentially lead to emancipatory change” (Hobden and Jones 151). Problem-solving theory, on the other hand, is cast as a “guide to tactical actions which, intended or unintended, sustain the existing order (Cox 1986: 755).

Cox brings the political and social spheres together in his analysis and “seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved” in context to a “continuing process of historical change” in time and space (1986: 754).  His inclusion of civil society into the equation of the world system and his implied assertion that reality is developing as a result of two diametrically opposed forces, A and anti-A, are departures from realist and neorealist views on system continuity, objectivity and a priori rationalism.

Cox organizes critical theory around “historical structures” which serve as “frameworks for action” (1986: 760-761). These historical structures are composed of three planks defined as ideas, material capabilities and institutions that assume a unique configuration within a “limited totality” and operate within three interrelated spheres of activity referred to as social forces produced by the production process, forms of state and world orders (Cox 1986: 760-765). Cox’s view differs in several ways from the neorealist view. It favors change over status quo, intersubjective over material composition, a limited (spherical) view over the whole view of the world, and the “origins, growth and demise” of the structure over structural rigidity and stability (Cox 1986: 767).

It is within these historical structures and spheres of activity that Cox builds his Marxist case against the prevailing capitalist system and its tendency to reward the political elites and reinforce status quo. Cox describes a hegemony as “an intersubjective understanding of power and social relations, whereby people in all significant social categories acquiesce in the normality of things as they are” (2007: 260). Thus, Cox’s hegemony is one in which the real source of power is consensual and the distribution of material capabilities is only one component, a minor one at that. If a state has significantly greater material capabilities than all other states, but cannot get other states to acquiesce to its wishes, then it is merely dominant and not hegemonic. Secondly, Cox notes that the hegemonic structure is an “inherently unstable system” (Hobden and Jones 151) that is simultaneously producing a latent counter-structure to topple the system while reinforcing the perpetuity of the current structure through consent (1986: 770). This apparent contradiction in structural principle also sets Cox’s view of hegemony apart from neorealist and neoliberal views which instead predict continuity and rely less upon the ideological power of consent to affect outcomes.

The end game of historical materialism is an inevitable, counter-structural revolution producing the classless state of communism where “economic class conflict is purged from the planet, and all humans would become healthy, wealthy and fulfilled” (Lynch III 541-542). Cox fails to explain, however, why the end of class struggle represents a morally just state of affairs or how mankind will be happy or fulfilled as a result.

Cox – Critical Evaluation. While realism, neorealism and neoliberalism rely on consistency and status quo, Cox’s historical materialism purposefully looks for contradictions and opportunities to break with status quo, making the future much more unpredictable.  Secondly, Cox emphasis on the production process as a main component of his theory is unique, as the mainstream theories tend to bury it within national interests or distribution of capabilities. Thirdly, Cox’s usage of historical structures as limited totalities provides richer and more detailed explanations for structural transformation than the traditional theories which tend to downplay social forces. Since the “configuration” of forces may change depending on the intensity of social opposition, system constraints and even state identities and interests may change as well, an improvement upon neorealism’s rigid constraints.

Realism, though, does offer similarities. Hans Morgenthau recognized that the international system is “frequently composed of a number of subsystems that are interrelated” (251), and admitted that “the interrelationship … is generally one of subordination” (251). Cox’s multi-leveled spheres of activity may be compared to Morgenthau’s subsystems. However, where Morgenthau sees polarity and balance of power influenced by the interests of rational, unitary state actors, Cox sees a mixture of interests, rival collective images and class struggle influenced by complex social structures that simultaneously reinforce the hegemony and plant the seeds for counter-revolution.

Cox takes a number of shots at Waltz, among them his assertion that structural realism cannot account for structural transformation (1986: 780). Waltz wrote, “To define a structure requires ignoring how units relate with one another” (291). Such statements are precisely why neorealism has explanatory limits on structural change. The regime and complex interdependency theories of neoliberal institutionalists provide legitimate channels for enhanced cooperation within the international system, but Cox unfortunately brushes them off as merely a “means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order” (1986: 762).

Conclusion

Wendt and Cox provide several perspectives and ideas that make positive contributions to the understanding of the structure of international relations provided by traditional theories. Specifically, their explanations of how social forces impact states’ interests and identities and help nation-states overcome the constraints of anarchy to forge new paths of structural transformation are worth further research and study. Their application to world affairs may provide strategic ideas for improving cooperation and resolving security dilemmas. While these two theories may help us “understand” the world better, traditional theories will still be required to help us “interpret” it more accurately and fill in the intersubjective gaps.

PDF of file available here Beyond Anarchy – How Wendt’s Social Constructivism and Cox’s Historical Materialism Redefine the International System and State Identities While Explaining Structural Transformation_Dwiggins

Works Cited

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