Tag Archive for Bosnia

NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach

February 18, 2013 International Relations, Paid Content, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

“NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW  to follow. Includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,821 words, 22 pages double-spaced, 60 references

Section One – NATO – Brief History and Background

Pre Cold War.  Hoehn and Harting note that increasing tensions with the Soviet Union over its Berlin Blockade (1948), China’s “short-lived embrace of Moscow” (5), and Communist incursions in Czechoslovakia and Korea led the United States, Canada and ten other Western European states to form NATO as a defensive alliance and formulate a policy of Soviet “containment” designed to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” in April of 1949 (8). Despite occasional disagreements over burden-sharing and a dust-up with France, alliance members “deterred the Soviets, and integrated Germany into a collective defense system for the West” over the next 40 years (Duignan 43), moving from a posture of deterrence to détente in a manner consistent with its values of “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO “Treaty”).

Post Cold War. NATO’s success with facilitating European integration and deterring the Soviet threat was rewarded with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in 1991 (Medcalf 196-197), as NATO “found itself without an enemy” for the first time in its history, earning a “bloodless victory … without firing a shot” (Duignan 46, 48). The collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged NATO to enlarge its membership into Eastern Europe (1999) and launch the Partnership for Peace (PfP) for military cooperation and dialogue with non-NATO states (1994) despite lingering doubts regarding NATO’s post-Cold War purpose and identity (Duignan 58). Read more

Strengths and Weaknesses of Truth Commissions vs. Amnesty Laws as States Recover from the Atrocities of War

February 18, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. 2011. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins.  FREE CONTENT

Truth Commissions (TCs) – TCs may be appointed or sponsored by national, international, NGO, or hybrid commissions (Bercovitch & Jackson 156). The strengths of truth commissions may include their low cost, flexibility, “wide range of purposes” that they serve, ability to “reconstitute the moral order and provide a measure of justice when trials are not an option,” usefulness in dealing with “disappearances and killings by anonymous death squads,” potential to end a culture of impunity, role in providing a new transitional government “room to maneuver,” and the “emotional therapy” they provide a “traumatized society” (Bercovitch & Jackson 159). But are TCs ‘compromise justice’ that actually weaken the ability to make peace?

Hayner’s analysis of 15 recent TCs is useful for delineating their strengths and weaknesses. Hayner notes that in Uganda (1974) the TC had “little impact on the practices of the Amin regime” (612); in Bolivia many abuses “were overlooked” (614); the Uruguay TC was “not a serious undertaking of human rights” (616); the Zimbabwe report “has never been available to the public” (617); the Chilean report resulted in a formal apology by the President and many recommendations being implemented (622). Furthermore, the Chad TC may have been established “to improve the new president’s image” and suffered from lack of funds (624-625); the El Salvador TC resulted in general amnesty only five days after publication of its report (629); and the South African ANC II report denied any “systematic policy of abuse” (633). Read more

Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them

February 17, 2013 International Relations, Paid Content, Post Conflict Reconstruction No comments

“Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW

I.    Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures Available in Nation/State-Building

A.    Definitions

B.     Tasks of Nation/State Building (NSB)

C.     Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures Available in NSB Processes

1.     Military Security

2.     Political

3.     Economic

4.     Justice and Reconciliation

II.    Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Nation/State Building

A.    Military/Security Pillar – Challenges Facing IOs, Coalitions and MNFs, and  States

B.    Political and Governance Pillar – Challenges Facing IOs, Coalitions and MNFs, and States

C.    Economic Pillar – Challenges Facing IOs, Coalitions and MNFs, and States

D.    Justice and Reconciliation Pillar – Challenges Facing IOs, Coalitions and MNFs, and States

III.    Section Three – Optimum Division of Labor to Meet NSB Challenges

A.    Proper Mix – International, Regional, Local, Multilateral & Bilateral

B.    Military/Economic/Political Division of Labor

IV.    Summary

Section One – Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures Available in Nation/State-Building

Definitions.  Nation-building and state-building are similar but not identical concepts with context often determining which term is applicable. Mary Thida Lun defines nation-building as “the indigenous and domestic creation and reinforcement of the complex social and cultural identities that relate to and define citizenship within the territory of the state” (v).   Read more

The Interconnectedness of Military, Political and Economic Tools in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

February 17, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Post Conflict Reconstruction No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. Jan. 2011. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. 12.5 pages, double-spaced, 3,310 words. 30 references.

Introduction                                       FREE CONTENT

Post-conflict reconstructionFor the last twenty years following the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict has transitioned from mostly interstate conflicts to predominantly intrastate conflicts characterized by a “complex web of social, economic, cultural, political and religious factors” (Bercovitch & Jackson 3). As the context underlying conflict has changed, the approaches to conflict resolution (CR) and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) have adapted as well. Policy-makers have a variety of military, political and economic tools at their disposal to contend with the security, welfare and political representation issues resulting from fragile and failed states.

This essay will analyze the policy tools available for CR and PCR, and, in doing so, answer the following questions:

(1)   To what extent are the political, economic and military tools available to policymakers for use in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction interconnected?

(2)  Has the application of such tools become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War? If so, how and why? If not, why not?

Section One of the essay will provide a brief summary of how the environment of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. Section Two will analyze the military tools. Section Three will cover the political tools, and Section Four will address the economic tools. Section Five will include a brief summary of how these tools are interconnected, but the assertion that they are interconnected will be made in each section of the essay.

Likewise, the question of whether the application of these tools has become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War may be answered in the affirmative with the how and why addressed throughout each section of the paper. Section Six will conclude the paper with a brief summary of the essay.

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.

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