Tag Archive for democracy

Blind Man’s Bluff: Kazakhstan’s Mirage of Compliance with International Obligations to Uphold the Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly and Association

February 20, 2013 Human Rights & Conflict, International Relations, Paid Content No comments

“Blind Man’s Bluff: Kazakhstan’s Mirage of Compliance with International Obligations to Uphold the Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly and Association” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

© Kapok Tree Diplomacy. May 2011. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins.

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Section One – The Right to Freedom of Expression

ICCPR Principles and Obligations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), though not legally binding, declares that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression … and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers” (Art. 19).The ICCPR, which Kazakhstan ratified in 2006 (UN Treaty Collection), expands upon this definition and binds state parties “in accordance with its terms and with international law” (Steiner, Alston and Goodman (SAG) 152). Treaty obligations are to be governed by the Vienna Convention’s Article 26 fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda which states, “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith” (Dunoff, Ratner & Wippman (DRW) 58). Article 19 of the ICCPR declares:        Read more

NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach

February 18, 2013 International Relations, Paid Content, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts No comments

“NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW  to follow. Includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,821 words, 22 pages double-spaced, 60 references

Section One – NATO – Brief History and Background

Pre Cold War.  Hoehn and Harting note that increasing tensions with the Soviet Union over its Berlin Blockade (1948), China’s “short-lived embrace of Moscow” (5), and Communist incursions in Czechoslovakia and Korea led the United States, Canada and ten other Western European states to form NATO as a defensive alliance and formulate a policy of Soviet “containment” designed to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” in April of 1949 (8). Despite occasional disagreements over burden-sharing and a dust-up with France, alliance members “deterred the Soviets, and integrated Germany into a collective defense system for the West” over the next 40 years (Duignan 43), moving from a posture of deterrence to détente in a manner consistent with its values of “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO “Treaty”).

Post Cold War. NATO’s success with facilitating European integration and deterring the Soviet threat was rewarded with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in 1991 (Medcalf 196-197), as NATO “found itself without an enemy” for the first time in its history, earning a “bloodless victory … without firing a shot” (Duignan 46, 48). The collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged NATO to enlarge its membership into Eastern Europe (1999) and launch the Partnership for Peace (PfP) for military cooperation and dialogue with non-NATO states (1994) despite lingering doubts regarding NATO’s post-Cold War purpose and identity (Duignan 58). Read more

The Interconnectedness of Military, Political and Economic Tools in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction

February 17, 2013 Free Content, International Relations, Post Conflict Reconstruction No comments

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. Jan. 2011. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. 12.5 pages, double-spaced, 3,310 words. 30 references.

Introduction                                       FREE CONTENT

Post-conflict reconstructionFor the last twenty years following the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict has transitioned from mostly interstate conflicts to predominantly intrastate conflicts characterized by a “complex web of social, economic, cultural, political and religious factors” (Bercovitch & Jackson 3). As the context underlying conflict has changed, the approaches to conflict resolution (CR) and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) have adapted as well. Policy-makers have a variety of military, political and economic tools at their disposal to contend with the security, welfare and political representation issues resulting from fragile and failed states.

This essay will analyze the policy tools available for CR and PCR, and, in doing so, answer the following questions:

(1)   To what extent are the political, economic and military tools available to policymakers for use in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction interconnected?

(2)  Has the application of such tools become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War? If so, how and why? If not, why not?

Section One of the essay will provide a brief summary of how the environment of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. Section Two will analyze the military tools. Section Three will cover the political tools, and Section Four will address the economic tools. Section Five will include a brief summary of how these tools are interconnected, but the assertion that they are interconnected will be made in each section of the essay.

Likewise, the question of whether the application of these tools has become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War may be answered in the affirmative with the how and why addressed throughout each section of the paper. Section Six will conclude the paper with a brief summary of the essay.

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.

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Zero Problems – Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia

February 14, 2013 International Relations, Paid Content, Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts, Uncategorized No comments

“Zero Problems – Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

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Global Integration as Seen Through the Ideological Lenses of the International Political Economy

February 9, 2013 International Relations, Intl. Political Economy, Paid Content No comments

“Global Integration as Seen Through the Lenses of the Ideologies of the International Political Economy” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

Preview                                              Written April 2010

Section One – Conceptions of IPE

Main Actors and Their Goals. Dunne and Schmidt state that “Realism identifies the group as the fundamental unit of political analysis” and “the state as the legitimate representative of the people” (93), while other actors such as international organizations (IGOs) or multinational corporations (MNCs) have lesser prominence (103). Realists view the international system as competitive and inherently anarchic, thus driving states to “simultaneously pursue wealth and national power” under the principle of self-help (Gilpin 425). Some realists argue that states are power maximizers, while others argue they are security maximizers (Dunne & Schmidt 101). The end goal in either case is survival, and economic success is central to each strategy.

Liberals position the “individual consumer, firm, or household” as the main actor within IPE. Gilpin asserts that the “primary objective of economic activity (for liberals) is to benefit consumers” by using free market principles for “organizing and managing a market economy in order to achieve maximum efficiency, economic growth and individual welfare” (421). Goal attainment is furthered by these actors peacefully cooperating in a way that allows supply and demand to settle into a natural, stable equilibrium (Gilpin 422). Other groups like IGOs and MNCs compete for centrality with states “through multiple channels of interaction”(Dunne 115).

The main actors within Marxism are social classes, principally the bourgeoisie upper class who owns the economic means of production and the proletariat lower class who works for the bourgeoisie (Lynch 537-539). The goal of the bourgeoisie is wealth accumulation for themselves and increasing power and profits for their class while subjugating the proletariat in the process. Gilpin notes that Lenin reformulated Marxism to the extent that “the principal actors in effect became competing mercantilistic nation-states driven by economic necessity” (430). Whether the main actors be classes or states, the goal is the same in Marxism – maximization of elitist interests.

Policies and Views on International Relations.  Gilpin asserts that the “foremost objective of nationalists is industrialization” as it is the “basis of military power and central to national security” (“Three” 425). Realists, or economic nationalists or mercantilists (as referred to in IPE terminology), also emphasize national self-sufficiency which may result in protectionist measures to insulate infant or declining industries (Gilpin,”Three”, 426).  James Fallows points out how politics drives economics in nationalism by comparing it to liberalism and illustrating the importance of “deliberate development,” production over consumption, results over process, “business as war” over “business as peace,” and national interests over individual interests (61-87). In realism, states seek to maximize their sovereign independence through wealth and power.

The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa – Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?

February 2, 2013 International Relations, Intl. Political Economy, Paid Content No comments

“The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa – Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW    includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,920 words, 20 pages double-spaced, 29 references. Kapok Tree Diplomacy. May 2010.

Table of Contents

I.  Period Summaries of Growing China-Africa Partnership

A.  Period of 1950 – 1989

B.  Period of 1990 – 1999

C.  Period of 2000 to the Present

II.  China’s Mercantilist Intentions

A.  State Capitalism

B.  Trade Ownership Export Strategy

C.  Application of the Beijing Consensus in Africa

D.  Soft Power

E.  National Security

F.  Beijing’s New World Order

III.  Problems with Peaceful Coexistence – Resistance and Contradictions

A.  African Resistance and Unkept Promises

B.  Contradictions with China’s Fulfillment of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

IV.  Conclusions

Kapok Tree Diplomacy 22 May 2010  

The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa – Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?  

This research paper will explore Chinese intentions in sub-Saharan Africa. It will analyze the following topics in context to China’s involvement with Africa: the ideological foundation of the Beijing Consensus; China’s trade and mercantilist development policies; the military and national security aspects of China’s activities; its strategic use of soft power and diplomacy; China’s push for a reconfigured, multi-polar world order, and the implications of this order and policies for Western nations, especially the United States.  

By carefully substituting national economic rights for individual human rights and non- interference over ethics and transparency, China imposes its own brand of neomercantilism and no-strings-attached foreign aid, making sure it obtains substantially more relative gains than Africa despite its constant ‘win-win’ rhetoric and assertions of equal partnership. The main thesis of this paper is that while China simultaneously and deftly pursues an aggressive geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy that seeks to counter Western global influence by cultivating an attractive, scalable model of strategic partnership in sub-Saharan Africa based on Eastern values of peaceful coexistence and non-interference, the inherent contradictions and values within this strategy undermine democracy, human rights, governmental stability, state sovereignty and long-term economic viability in Africa.  

The thread of China’s geo-economic goals of securing important supplies of natural resources to feed its growing economy and enhance its global economic sphere of influence and its geopolitical goals of strengthening its leverage, interests and security within the international order will be explored throughout the paper. The first section will trace the roots of the China- Africa partnership through modern times. The second section will cover the components of China’s complex strategy: state capitalism, a mercantilist export strategy, the Beijing Consensus and foreign policy, soft power, security implications and China’s expressed desire for a new world order. The third section will cover inherent contradictions within China’s strategy as well as African resistance to it. This paper will conclude with the assertion that genuine Chinese intentions are not completely benign, but instead primarily serve national interests and mask realist aspirations for greater power and leadership on a dramatically redefined world stage.  

Section One – Period Summaries of Growing China-Africa Partnership  

Period of 1950 – 1989.  

Kieran Uchehara describes three distinct periods in the growing China- Africa partnership beginning in the 1950’s and 1960’s when China supported several nationalist movements in African states who were striving for independence, followed by China’s procurement of a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and concluding with the recent “liberalization and subsequent growth of the Chinese economy,” especially after the civilian uprising at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (96-97). An important component of the ideological roots of China’s partnership with Africa was solidified during the first phase, South- South cooperation and resistance to Western hegemony.  

This ideological thread formally emerged during the Bandung Conference which was held in 1955 and attended by 29 Asian and African nations (Uchehara 96). “Colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers” were main topics on the economic and cultural agenda (Uchehara 96). It was during this conference that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that would become a major foundation of China’s soft power impetus were adopted by China and Africa: (1) mutual respect for political and economic sovereignty; (2) mutual non-interference in internal affairs; (3) equality and mutual benefit; (4) peaceful resolution of conflicts; and (5) equal and fair representation in world affairs (Mensah 98). Mensah also notes that while China is often lauded for its respect for sovereignty and non- interference, multilateral cooperation with African nations is conditioned by one important principle: adhere to the one China policy and reject official relations with Taiwan “which its views as a rogue or renegade province (98).  

China increased diplomatic visits, sold military equipment, and provided some agricultural and medical aid to Africa in the 1970’s and 1980’s, while also constructing some first-class infrastructure projects including the 1,860-km Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) Railway for about $455 million in 1976 (Meidan 74), the largest foreign-aid project China had undertaken to date. Michal Meidan explains that China turned inward in the 1980’s to modernize and beef up its economy to compete with the West, effectively putting Africa on the back burner (74-76).  

The events at Tiananmen Square, however, served to turn China’s focus on Africa “from one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis” as Western nations condemned Chinese Communist Party leadership, whom Naidu et al. asserts were caught “off-guard” and “demeaned” by the “sharp focus on human rights” (89-91). Several African nations had their own issues with human rights abuse and did not want to jeopardize important foreign aid from China although it was declining at the time (Naidu et. al. 91). Africa’s moot response to Tiananmen and China’s presumption of Western interference in its affairs resulted in the perfect storm that strengthened political and economic ties and ignited China’s “diplomatic charm offensive” in Africa to “push for a multipolar world order that resisted Western (U.S.) hegemony” (Naidu et. al. 91). The relationship would become more economically pragmatic in the 1990’s while retaining its ideological core.  

Period of 1990 – 1999.  

As China gradually adopted some liberal reforms in its economy in the 1990’s, its GDP grew by an average annual rate of 9.5% annually (Spero and Hart 407) and so did its thirst for oil. The Trade Law Center for Southern Africa (Tralac) reports that bilateral trade between China and Africa grew from $3.9B to $6.5B between 1995 and 1999 and imports of crude oil went from $258M to $875M in that same timeframe, though soaring to $3.6B in 2000 (“Total Trade” tab, 2010). China’s indigenous sources of oil are stagnant with annual growth of 2% a year versus soaring demand of 10% a year (Meidan 77).  

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