Tag Archive for development

China’s Assertion of Sovereign Authority in the Global Commons and the Escalation of Legal Warfare in the Arctic

“China’s Assertion of Sovereign Authority in the Global Commons and the Escalation of Legal Warfare in the Arctic” by Jeff Dwiggins

© Kapok Tree Diplomacy. June 2013. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins.   PREVIEW

“After the Northwest Passage is opened up …  the sea route between Europe, Asia, and North America will be shortened by 5,200 to 7,000 nautical miles. Whoever controls the Arctic sea route will control the world economy and a new internationally strategic corridor.”[1]  Li Zhenfu

Topic

Competition among Arctic states is heating up over access to the Arctic’s undiscovered but potentially vast deposits of oil, natural gas and rare earth minerals.[2]  Moreover, the diminishing thickness and range of sea ice that could eventually make the Northern Sea Route significantly more accessible for cheaper and faster transoceanic shipping has also attracted the geopolitical interest of several non-Arctic states, most notably China.[3] The undeveloped resources are located almost exclusively in the legal territorial waters of Arctic states like Russia, Denmark, the United States and Canada.[4] These states have already made credible territorial claims to the United Nations and are prepared to protect their interests militarily if necessary.[5] So how will China assert its rights and interests in the Arctic without getting into a military conflict?

This essay will examine how China will redefine the Clausewitzian battlefield and utilize legal warfare (sometimes called lawfare) as an “offensive weapon” to “seize the political initiative” and shape international public opinion about the Arctic and sovereign territorial claims through non-military means, negotiations, diplomacy and international law to project power and accomplish its core national strategic objectives.[6]   It will examine China’s use of legal warfare as a preferred strategy for addressing critical challenges to China’s assertion of rights and interests in the Arctic, including the competing sovereignty and territorial claims by Arctic states and the risks, costs and uncertainty of harvesting the resources themselves.[7] Read more

Engaging the Dragon Through Peaceful Deterrence: Japan’s Need to Recalibrate Its Strategy of Accommodation with China

“Engaging the Dragon Through Peaceful Deterrence: Japan’s Need to Recalibrate Its Strategy of Accommodation with China” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

© Kapok Tree Diplomacy. Oct 2012. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. 

PREVIEW

Theoretical Framework

The grand strategies and values of Japan and China will be evaluated from a “Balance of Threat” and “Defensive Realism” theoretical framework.  This essay posits that given China’s rise and Japan’s moment of opportunity to counter, it is important to gauge the feasibility of a values-based concert of democracies within this theoretical framework. Stephen Walt argues that states tend to balance or bandwagon with a rising power depending on their assessment of the perceived threat.[1] Japan’s past, present and future behavior towards China is thus assessed within the parameters of defensive realism which point to Japanese formation of strategic alliances to deal with the anarchy and security dilemma that characterize the international system and create uncertainty of intentions and inadvertent mistrust and conflict.[2] Read more

NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach

“NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW  to follow. Includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,821 words, 22 pages double-spaced, 60 references

Section One – NATO – Brief History and Background

Pre Cold War.  Hoehn and Harting note that increasing tensions with the Soviet Union over its Berlin Blockade (1948), China’s “short-lived embrace of Moscow” (5), and Communist incursions in Czechoslovakia and Korea led the United States, Canada and ten other Western European states to form NATO as a defensive alliance and formulate a policy of Soviet “containment” designed to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down” in April of 1949 (8). Despite occasional disagreements over burden-sharing and a dust-up with France, alliance members “deterred the Soviets, and integrated Germany into a collective defense system for the West” over the next 40 years (Duignan 43), moving from a posture of deterrence to détente in a manner consistent with its values of “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” (NATO “Treaty”).

Post Cold War. NATO’s success with facilitating European integration and deterring the Soviet threat was rewarded with the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union in 1991 (Medcalf 196-197), as NATO “found itself without an enemy” for the first time in its history, earning a “bloodless victory … without firing a shot” (Duignan 46, 48). The collapse of the Soviet Union encouraged NATO to enlarge its membership into Eastern Europe (1999) and launch the Partnership for Peace (PfP) for military cooperation and dialogue with non-NATO states (1994) despite lingering doubts regarding NATO’s post-Cold War purpose and identity (Duignan 58). Read more

Do NGOs have a Place in Conflict Resolution? Are They Really Neutral? Are Military PRTs the Answer?

(C) Kapok Tree Diplomacy. 2010. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins. FREE CONTENT

NGOs are essential to conflict resolution in as much as they possess the necessary skills, knowledge, personnel and experience to help resolve the conflict and the context is favorable to their participation. Certainly, the traditional role of the NGO has changed in nature from one of purely humanitarian relief to one that includes the roles of civil society builder and peace broker. This role transformation challenges the NGO’s assertion of neutrality and inviolability. Pamela Aall lists certain conditions that must exist prior to NGO conflict resolution intervention, saying NGOs must have:

·   Knowledge of the country and the regional institutions involved (14)

·   Indigenous partners (14)

·   Good knowledge of conflict mediation skills (14)

·   Inherent understanding of the personal risks involved (14)

David Baharvar explains, “The basic mission of the major NGOs devoted to international ethnic conflict resolution is to transform the way that torn societies deal with a conflict and to improve the process of conciliation. Their efforts typically are focused on capacity-building: consultation, dialogue, and training in conflict resolution for people on all sides of an ethnic conflict” (2001).

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.  Read more

Dominant Issues in Free Trade and the International Economic System

Jeff Dwiggins:    Kapok Tree Diplomacy. All rights reserved. March 2010.

Dominant Issues in Free Trade and the International Economic System –  FREE CONTENTDoha Round

This study will analyze some of the most important themes of global trade beginning with the effects of globalization and interdependence on developed and developing countries and the benefits of trade liberalization.  Institutional leadership and governance are discussed, and the argument is made for free trade over protectionism with the caveat that protectionism may have a place in the strategies of developing countries.  The paper reviews the advantages of bilateral over multilateral agreements, the impact of technology on the diversification of trade, and how the elimination of barriers to trade and agreement on certain agricultural issues and subsidies would open up free trade to more players. The paper concludes by offering differing opinions on how best to help developing nations.

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.

Section One – Globalization and Interdependence

The National Intelligence Council (NIC) describes globalization as a “growing interconnectedness reflected in the expanded flows of information, technology, capital, goods, services and people throughout the world” (“2020 Project”). One way this growing interconnectedness has manifests itself is in the sheer size of the world economy and the number of new economic powerhouses rising to prominent places on the global stage. The NIC states, “The world economy is projected to be about 80 percent larger in 2020 than it was in 2000, and average per capita income to be about 50 percent higher” (“2020 Project”).   Read more

The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa – Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?

“The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa – Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy

PREVIEW    includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,920 words, 20 pages double-spaced, 29 references. Kapok Tree Diplomacy. May 2010.

Table of Contents

I.  Period Summaries of Growing China-Africa Partnership

A.  Period of 1950 – 1989

B.  Period of 1990 – 1999

C.  Period of 2000 to the Present

II.  China’s Mercantilist Intentions

A.  State Capitalism

B.  Trade Ownership Export Strategy

C.  Application of the Beijing Consensus in Africa

D.  Soft Power

E.  National Security

F.  Beijing’s New World Order

III.  Problems with Peaceful Coexistence – Resistance and Contradictions

A.  African Resistance and Unkept Promises

B.  Contradictions with China’s Fulfillment of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

IV.  Conclusions

Kapok Tree Diplomacy 22 May 2010  

The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa – Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?  

This research paper will explore Chinese intentions in sub-Saharan Africa. It will analyze the following topics in context to China’s involvement with Africa: the ideological foundation of the Beijing Consensus; China’s trade and mercantilist development policies; the military and national security aspects of China’s activities; its strategic use of soft power and diplomacy; China’s push for a reconfigured, multi-polar world order, and the implications of this order and policies for Western nations, especially the United States.  

By carefully substituting national economic rights for individual human rights and non- interference over ethics and transparency, China imposes its own brand of neomercantilism and no-strings-attached foreign aid, making sure it obtains substantially more relative gains than Africa despite its constant ‘win-win’ rhetoric and assertions of equal partnership. The main thesis of this paper is that while China simultaneously and deftly pursues an aggressive geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy that seeks to counter Western global influence by cultivating an attractive, scalable model of strategic partnership in sub-Saharan Africa based on Eastern values of peaceful coexistence and non-interference, the inherent contradictions and values within this strategy undermine democracy, human rights, governmental stability, state sovereignty and long-term economic viability in Africa.  

The thread of China’s geo-economic goals of securing important supplies of natural resources to feed its growing economy and enhance its global economic sphere of influence and its geopolitical goals of strengthening its leverage, interests and security within the international order will be explored throughout the paper. The first section will trace the roots of the China- Africa partnership through modern times. The second section will cover the components of China’s complex strategy: state capitalism, a mercantilist export strategy, the Beijing Consensus and foreign policy, soft power, security implications and China’s expressed desire for a new world order. The third section will cover inherent contradictions within China’s strategy as well as African resistance to it. This paper will conclude with the assertion that genuine Chinese intentions are not completely benign, but instead primarily serve national interests and mask realist aspirations for greater power and leadership on a dramatically redefined world stage.  

Section One – Period Summaries of Growing China-Africa Partnership  

Period of 1950 – 1989.  

Kieran Uchehara describes three distinct periods in the growing China- Africa partnership beginning in the 1950’s and 1960’s when China supported several nationalist movements in African states who were striving for independence, followed by China’s procurement of a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and concluding with the recent “liberalization and subsequent growth of the Chinese economy,” especially after the civilian uprising at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (96-97). An important component of the ideological roots of China’s partnership with Africa was solidified during the first phase, South- South cooperation and resistance to Western hegemony.  

This ideological thread formally emerged during the Bandung Conference which was held in 1955 and attended by 29 Asian and African nations (Uchehara 96). “Colonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers” were main topics on the economic and cultural agenda (Uchehara 96). It was during this conference that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that would become a major foundation of China’s soft power impetus were adopted by China and Africa: (1) mutual respect for political and economic sovereignty; (2) mutual non-interference in internal affairs; (3) equality and mutual benefit; (4) peaceful resolution of conflicts; and (5) equal and fair representation in world affairs (Mensah 98). Mensah also notes that while China is often lauded for its respect for sovereignty and non- interference, multilateral cooperation with African nations is conditioned by one important principle: adhere to the one China policy and reject official relations with Taiwan “which its views as a rogue or renegade province (98).  

China increased diplomatic visits, sold military equipment, and provided some agricultural and medical aid to Africa in the 1970’s and 1980’s, while also constructing some first-class infrastructure projects including the 1,860-km Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) Railway for about $455 million in 1976 (Meidan 74), the largest foreign-aid project China had undertaken to date. Michal Meidan explains that China turned inward in the 1980’s to modernize and beef up its economy to compete with the West, effectively putting Africa on the back burner (74-76).  

The events at Tiananmen Square, however, served to turn China’s focus on Africa “from one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis” as Western nations condemned Chinese Communist Party leadership, whom Naidu et al. asserts were caught “off-guard” and “demeaned” by the “sharp focus on human rights” (89-91). Several African nations had their own issues with human rights abuse and did not want to jeopardize important foreign aid from China although it was declining at the time (Naidu et. al. 91). Africa’s moot response to Tiananmen and China’s presumption of Western interference in its affairs resulted in the perfect storm that strengthened political and economic ties and ignited China’s “diplomatic charm offensive” in Africa to “push for a multipolar world order that resisted Western (U.S.) hegemony” (Naidu et. al. 91). The relationship would become more economically pragmatic in the 1990’s while retaining its ideological core.  

Period of 1990 – 1999.  

As China gradually adopted some liberal reforms in its economy in the 1990’s, its GDP grew by an average annual rate of 9.5% annually (Spero and Hart 407) and so did its thirst for oil. The Trade Law Center for Southern Africa (Tralac) reports that bilateral trade between China and Africa grew from $3.9B to $6.5B between 1995 and 1999 and imports of crude oil went from $258M to $875M in that same timeframe, though soaring to $3.6B in 2000 (“Total Trade” tab, 2010). China’s indigenous sources of oil are stagnant with annual growth of 2% a year versus soaring demand of 10% a year (Meidan 77).  

Read more