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	<title>Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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	<description>Exploring the conduct of international relations and the ideals of democracy &#38; individual liberty in the context of the Christian worldview.</description>
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		<title>Reflections on the Israel-Hamas Conflict in Gaza and Stray Voltage on Genocide, Proportionality, Apartheid, Collective Punishment, and the Impact of the (Demise of) the Right of Conquest  </title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/reflections-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict-in-gaza-and-stray-voltage-on-genocide-proportionality-apartheid-legality-of-settlements-and-the-demise-of-the-right-of-conquest/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/reflections-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict-in-gaza-and-stray-voltage-on-genocide-proportionality-apartheid-legality-of-settlements-and-the-demise-of-the-right-of-conquest/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2023 07:10:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Human Rights & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intl Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[apartheid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Gaza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[genocide]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=909</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Disclaimer: The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of my employer, the Department of Defense (DoD),]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">909</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/natos-role-and-relevance-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-challenges-in-implementing-the-comprehensive-approach/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 14:04:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paid Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=352</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) purpose has evolved from one “resolved to unite their [members’] efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security” (NATO “Treaty”), to one of collective security responding to “out of area” conflicts, the organization has become far more than a military alliance. These conflicts have provided NATO the opportunity to engage in both military and non-military aspects of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) in robust peacebuilding operations aimed not only at stabilizing the security situation, but rebuilding the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89).
 
NATO’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to link up military and civilian resources has encountered numerous practical and political challenges, not the least of which has been a lack of adequate resources and uneven burden-sharing amongst its members. “Stated another way, NATO is an alliance … caught up in a myriad of contentious and costly operations that prevent it from appropriately posturing for the 21st century security environment” (Warren 8). 

This paper will explore NATO’s challenges in coordinating the military and civilian aspects of PCR and answer the following questions: Is NATO effective at executing complex civil-military interventions, and secondly, has the alliance found its relevance and purpose?

{The posts, views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces}]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">352</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Strengths and Weaknesses of Truth Commissions vs. Amnesty Laws as States Recover from the Atrocities of War</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-truth-commissions-vs-amnesty-laws-as-states-recover-from-the-atrocities-of-war/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:02:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amnesty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bosnia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[forgiveness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hayner]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hybrid commissions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Criminal Court]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[negotiated peace settlements]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NGOs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[prosecution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[punishment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[retributive justice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[revenge killings]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[truth commissions]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=348</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Truth Commissions (TCs) – TCs may be appointed or sponsored by national, international, NGO, or hybrid commissions (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 156). The strengths of truth commissions may include their low cost, flexibility, “wide range of purposes” that they serve, ability to “reconstitute the moral order and provide a measure of justice when trials are not an option,” usefulness in dealing with “disappearances and killings by anonymous death squads,” potential to end a culture of impunity, role in providing a new transitional government “room to maneuver,” and the “emotional therapy” they provide a “traumatized society” (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 159). But are TCs ‘compromise justice’ that actually weaken the ability to make peace?

Hayner’s analysis of 15 recent TCs is useful for delineating their strengths and weaknesses. Hayner notes that in Uganda (1974) the TC had “little impact on the practices of the Amin regime” (612); in Bolivia many abuses “were overlooked” (614); the Uruguay TC was “not a serious undertaking of human rights” (616); the Zimbabwe report “has never been available to the public” (617); the Chilean report resulted in a formal apology by the President and many recommendations being implemented (622). Furthermore, the Chad TC may have been established “to improve the new president’s image” and suffered from lack of funds (624-625); the El Salvador TC resulted in general amnesty only five days after publication of its report (629); and the South African ANC II report denied any “systematic policy of abuse” (633).]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">348</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Do NGOs have a Place in Conflict Resolution?  Are They Really Neutral? Are Military PRTs the Answer?</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/do-ngos-have-a-place-in-conflict-resolution-what-about-neutrality-are-military-prts-the-answer/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2013 14:42:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=309</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[NGOs are essential to conflict resolution in as much as they possess the necessary skills, knowledge, personnel and experience to help resolve the conflict and the context is favorable to their participation. Certainly, the traditional role of the NGO has changed in nature from one of purely humanitarian relief to one that includes the roles of civil society builder and peace broker. This role transformation challenges the NGO’s assertion of neutrality and inviolability. Pamela Aall lists certain conditions that must exist prior to NGO conflict resolution intervention, saying NGOs must have:

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">309</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Using Economic and Military Tools in Conflict Prevention</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/using-economic-and-military-tools-in-conflict-prevention/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2013 14:26:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[balance-of-payments]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=302</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[There’s a number of economic tools that may be effective in preventing conflict. Most seem to fall under good governance. The first one that comes to my mind is export diversity. If you depend on one item for 44% of your exports and that one item is a commodity as it is with Sierra Leone’s diamonds, your economy is extremely vulnerable to global price fluctuations in that commodity. A downward dip in prices can have a devastating effect when all your eggs are in one basket. If people have to be laid off or you have to cut their wages, then social dissent can escalate as a result.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">302</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Are Confidence Building Measures Effective in the Middle East?</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/are-confidence-building-measures-effective-in-the-middle-east/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2013 14:16:33 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[CBMs]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=299</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Diehl lays out five dimensions of peace building which are applicable to the situation in the sense that CBM’s can be a significant component of peace building activities.  Diehl’s dimensions are (1) the goal; (2) the strategy and activities; (3) the timing; (4) the context; and (5) the actors who will bring it about (8-11).]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">299</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Zero Problems &#8211; Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/zero-problems-enhancing-security-and-preventing-conflict-in-turkeys-evolving-partnerships-with-the-european-union-united-states-middle-east-russia-and-eurasia/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 17:55:01 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=290</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Turkey’s security partnerships with Europe, NATO and the United States have played an important role in its foreign policy decisions since the 1950’s as a counter to Russia during the Cold War (CountryWatch, “Political History”). Founded on the principles of “secularism, strong nationalism, statism, and to a degree, western orientation” by Mustafa Kemal after the collapse of the 600-year old Ottoman Empire (U.S. State Dept., Background Note), Turkey is uniquely positioned at the crossroads and nexus of “four areas of growing strategic importance in the post-Cold War era” (Larrabee 3): the Balkans and Europe, the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, and the Caucasus/Central Asia region. 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the onset of two Persian Gulf Wars, Turkey’s interests and strategic alliances began to markedly shift their trajectories (Larrabee 6-9). This paper will explore Turkey's recent modifications of its strategic security partnerships from the perspectives of key states within each of its regional spheres of influence in a context of conflict prevention. Section One will review the Balkans and European perspective; in Section Two the Middle East; Eurasia and the Caucasus in Section Three with a special slant on Russia; and in Section Four the United States. Section Five will review Turkey’s internal domestic issues to include the Kurdish challenge, political trends, global aspirations and some interesting comparisons with China. The paper will conclude with Section Six and some recommended conflict prevention strategies to counterbalance Turkey’s various threats. 

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. 
]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">290</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Zero Problems &#8211; Turkey &#8211; FREE PREVIEW</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/zero-problems-turkey-free-preview/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/zero-problems-turkey-free-preview/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 17:11:26 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ahmet Davutoğlu]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[human rights]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=288</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[European Union (EU) Accession. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, says that EU Accession is on an “irreversible course” that will produce enhanced peace, stability, indivisibility of security, economic interdependence, cultural harmony and convergent interests in a region that includes the Balkans, the Caucasus, Europe and the Middle East (Davutoğlu:EU 12-17). The interests of the EU and Turkey do not, however, always converge harmoniously, and accession progress has slowed considerably since Brussels opened membership talks in 2005 with major regional security implications (Alessandri 28-29). 

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">288</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken by the International Community to Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paid Content]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Côte d’Ivoire]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Background. Having traced the sources and causes of the conflict, this paper will analyze the steps taken by members of the international community to resolve, contain or prevent the conflict. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since the conflict broke out in September 2002. War fatigue has set in, and the conflict is now less about north versus south and more about who will ultimately control the means of power, security and wealth accumulation after the October 2010 elections. The historic March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) wrested control of the peace process from the international community and put it squarely into the hands of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo and Ivoirian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel leader (Ayangafac, “Peace” 27).

Why did so many previously negotiated agreements with international support not get implemented? What is different about the OPA? What will each party gain or lose from reunification? This paper will examine the answers to these questions through the lens and actions of each key participant in various stages of the conflict to include: France, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, Burkina Faso, Gbagbo, Soro, and other political parties and FN zone commanders.

This paper will explore the idea that as the political, economic and military status has gradually shifted on the ground, each actor has deftly altered their strategies accordingly, especially Gbagbo. The result of these collective actions was a ‘peaceful’ diplomatic stalemate and deterrence to reunification. The case will be made that although the OPA has positive potential, it mainly preserves Gbagbo and Soro’s political security without guaranteeing reunification and the prevention of future violence. 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">281</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>PREVIEW &#8211; Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken By the International Community To Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict-free-preview/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2013 23:46:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=274</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Actions of the Main Actors

France.  After a failed military coup on September 19, 2002, France quickly moved 700 troops into Côte d’Ivoire under a 1961 pact obligating it to defend its former colony from any external invasion (Kohler 31). But France also had 16,000 citizens and 210 subsidiaries of French companies (Kohler 31), in addition to $3.5 billion Euros in direct investment in industries like oil, gas, banking, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications to protect (Busch 52). ]]></description>
		
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