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	<title>amnesty &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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		<title>International and Regional Mechanisms for Holding Human Rights Offenders Accountable</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/international-and-regional-mechanisms-for-holding-human-rights-offenders-accountable/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/international-and-regional-mechanisms-for-holding-human-rights-offenders-accountable/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 23:40:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Human Rights & Conflict]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=368</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[United Nations charter-based and treaty-based bodies and regional human rights, commissions, courts and councils carry the responsibility for holding both states and individuals accountable for human rights violations. The efficacy of enforcement mechanisms, or lack thereof, and the reluctance of states to part with sovereignty often serve as obstacles to the realization of effective accountability. This essay will examine the different options for holding individuals and states accountable, the processes for obtaining justice, and the remedies, sanctions and enforcement mechanisms that may result. 

The essay will explore the effectiveness, strengths and weaknesses of the processes and punishments of the UN Charter and treaty-based bodies and regional institutions. The essay will conclude that the determination of which institution is more effective depends on a variety of factors to include the nature of the violation, the type of entity being held accountable – state or individual, the political will of the states involved, the jurisdiction and enforcement options available, the sufficiency and maturity of the regional, legal infrastructure, regional perceptions of impartiality and legitimacy, and the financial and legal resources at the disposal of the judicial institution. 
]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">368</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Strengths and Weaknesses of Truth Commissions vs. Amnesty Laws as States Recover from the Atrocities of War</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-truth-commissions-vs-amnesty-laws-as-states-recover-from-the-atrocities-of-war/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-truth-commissions-vs-amnesty-laws-as-states-recover-from-the-atrocities-of-war/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:02:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amnesty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bosnia]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Hayner]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[retributive justice]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[truth commissions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=348</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Truth Commissions (TCs) – TCs may be appointed or sponsored by national, international, NGO, or hybrid commissions (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 156). The strengths of truth commissions may include their low cost, flexibility, “wide range of purposes” that they serve, ability to “reconstitute the moral order and provide a measure of justice when trials are not an option,” usefulness in dealing with “disappearances and killings by anonymous death squads,” potential to end a culture of impunity, role in providing a new transitional government “room to maneuver,” and the “emotional therapy” they provide a “traumatized society” (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 159). But are TCs ‘compromise justice’ that actually weaken the ability to make peace?

Hayner’s analysis of 15 recent TCs is useful for delineating their strengths and weaknesses. Hayner notes that in Uganda (1974) the TC had “little impact on the practices of the Amin regime” (612); in Bolivia many abuses “were overlooked” (614); the Uruguay TC was “not a serious undertaking of human rights” (616); the Zimbabwe report “has never been available to the public” (617); the Chilean report resulted in a formal apology by the President and many recommendations being implemented (622). Furthermore, the Chad TC may have been established “to improve the new president’s image” and suffered from lack of funds (624-625); the El Salvador TC resulted in general amnesty only five days after publication of its report (629); and the South African ANC II report denied any “systematic policy of abuse” (633).]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">348</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 21:43:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[External actors such as international organizations (IOs), regional alliances (RAs), individual states, multinational forces (MNFs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly intervened in fragile and failed states in postconflict scenarios following the end of the Cold War. The nation/state-building processes (NSB) implemented by these actors to rebuild the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89) attempt to strike a reasonable balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in their efforts to rehabilitate security, political, economic and social institutions as well as establish a sense of common identity among citizens (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 175). 

This essay will analyze NSB processes around the core pillars of societal reform necessary to prevent a return to violence in context to the following points of emphasis:

(1)	 What types of challenges do the above-listed outside actors face in striking the balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in NSB processes?

(2)	What division of labor among IOs, RAs, states and NGOs is likely to prove most effective in meeting such challenges in the future and why? 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">327</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken by the International Community to Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paid Content]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Burkina Faso]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[civil war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compaoré]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[conflict resolution]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Prime Minister Guillaume Soro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rebels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reunification]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[The Ouagadougou Political Accord]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[zone of confidence]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Background. Having traced the sources and causes of the conflict, this paper will analyze the steps taken by members of the international community to resolve, contain or prevent the conflict. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since the conflict broke out in September 2002. War fatigue has set in, and the conflict is now less about north versus south and more about who will ultimately control the means of power, security and wealth accumulation after the October 2010 elections. The historic March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) wrested control of the peace process from the international community and put it squarely into the hands of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo and Ivoirian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel leader (Ayangafac, “Peace” 27).

Why did so many previously negotiated agreements with international support not get implemented? What is different about the OPA? What will each party gain or lose from reunification? This paper will examine the answers to these questions through the lens and actions of each key participant in various stages of the conflict to include: France, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, Burkina Faso, Gbagbo, Soro, and other political parties and FN zone commanders.

This paper will explore the idea that as the political, economic and military status has gradually shifted on the ground, each actor has deftly altered their strategies accordingly, especially Gbagbo. The result of these collective actions was a ‘peaceful’ diplomatic stalemate and deterrence to reunification. The case will be made that although the OPA has positive potential, it mainly preserves Gbagbo and Soro’s political security without guaranteeing reunification and the prevention of future violence. 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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