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	<title>cold war &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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	<description>Exploring the conduct of international relations and the ideals of democracy &#38; individual liberty in the context of the Christian worldview.</description>
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		<title>NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/natos-role-and-relevance-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-challenges-in-implementing-the-comprehensive-approach/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/natos-role-and-relevance-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-challenges-in-implementing-the-comprehensive-approach/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 14:04:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=352</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) purpose has evolved from one “resolved to unite their [members’] efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security” (NATO “Treaty”), to one of collective security responding to “out of area” conflicts, the organization has become far more than a military alliance. These conflicts have provided NATO the opportunity to engage in both military and non-military aspects of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) in robust peacebuilding operations aimed not only at stabilizing the security situation, but rebuilding the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89).
 
NATO’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to link up military and civilian resources has encountered numerous practical and political challenges, not the least of which has been a lack of adequate resources and uneven burden-sharing amongst its members. “Stated another way, NATO is an alliance … caught up in a myriad of contentious and costly operations that prevent it from appropriately posturing for the 21st century security environment” (Warren 8). 

This paper will explore NATO’s challenges in coordinating the military and civilian aspects of PCR and answer the following questions: Is NATO effective at executing complex civil-military interventions, and secondly, has the alliance found its relevance and purpose?

{The posts, views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces}]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">352</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 21:43:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[External actors such as international organizations (IOs), regional alliances (RAs), individual states, multinational forces (MNFs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly intervened in fragile and failed states in postconflict scenarios following the end of the Cold War. The nation/state-building processes (NSB) implemented by these actors to rebuild the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89) attempt to strike a reasonable balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in their efforts to rehabilitate security, political, economic and social institutions as well as establish a sense of common identity among citizens (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 175). 

This essay will analyze NSB processes around the core pillars of societal reform necessary to prevent a return to violence in context to the following points of emphasis:

(1)	 What types of challenges do the above-listed outside actors face in striking the balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in NSB processes?

(2)	What division of labor among IOs, RAs, states and NGOs is likely to prove most effective in meeting such challenges in the future and why? 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">327</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Interconnectedness of Military, Political and Economic Tools in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/the-interconnectedness-of-military-political-and-economic-tools-in-conflict-resolution-and-post-conflict-reconstruction/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 20:22:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=321</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[For the last twenty years following the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict has transitioned from mostly interstate conflicts to predominantly intrastate conflicts characterized by a “complex web of social, economic, cultural, political and religious factors” (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 3). As the context underlying conflict has changed, the approaches to conflict resolution (CR) and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) have adapted as well. Policy-makers have a variety of military, political and economic tools at their disposal to contend with the security, welfare and political representation issues resulting from fragile and failed states. 

This essay will analyze the policy tools available for CR and PCR and in so doing answer the following questions: 

(1)	 To what extent are the political, economic and military tools available to policymakers for use in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction interconnected?

(2)	Has the application of such tools become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War? If so, how and why? If not, why not? 

Section One of the essay will provide a brief summary of how the environment of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. Section Two will analyze the military tools. Section Three will cover the political tools, and Section Four will address the economic tools. Section Five will include a brief summary of how these tools are interconnected, but the assertion that they are interconnected will be made in each section of the essay.  

Likewise, the question of whether the application of these tools has become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War may be answered in the affirmative with the how and why addressed throughout each section of the paper. Section Six will conclude the paper with a brief summary of the essay. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">321</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Limitations of Classical Realism</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 02 Feb 2013 18:55:35 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[To what extent has neo-realism addressed the limitations of classical realism, if there be any, and overcome them or not? The following analytical essay shall engage this question by exploring each theory’s core assumptions and then review the effect of these assumptions on key areas of understanding international relations to include philosophical perspective, definitions of power and security, the role of anarchy and rationality, the distribution of capabilities and balance of power, and a definition of the international system. The essay will conclude by bringing both theories’ assumptions to bear upon the current crisis between the United States and Iran. Given the assumptions, I will draw conclusions as to which theory most accurately ascertains the situation and which is more likely to predict the outcome. 

* The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy or the Armed Forces. ]]></description>
		
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