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	<title>DD&amp;R &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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		<title>Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 21:43:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[External actors such as international organizations (IOs), regional alliances (RAs), individual states, multinational forces (MNFs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly intervened in fragile and failed states in postconflict scenarios following the end of the Cold War. The nation/state-building processes (NSB) implemented by these actors to rebuild the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89) attempt to strike a reasonable balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in their efforts to rehabilitate security, political, economic and social institutions as well as establish a sense of common identity among citizens (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 175). 

This essay will analyze NSB processes around the core pillars of societal reform necessary to prevent a return to violence in context to the following points of emphasis:

(1)	 What types of challenges do the above-listed outside actors face in striking the balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in NSB processes?

(2)	What division of labor among IOs, RAs, states and NGOs is likely to prove most effective in meeting such challenges in the future and why? 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. ]]></description>
		
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			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">327</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken by the International Community to Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Background. Having traced the sources and causes of the conflict, this paper will analyze the steps taken by members of the international community to resolve, contain or prevent the conflict. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since the conflict broke out in September 2002. War fatigue has set in, and the conflict is now less about north versus south and more about who will ultimately control the means of power, security and wealth accumulation after the October 2010 elections. The historic March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) wrested control of the peace process from the international community and put it squarely into the hands of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo and Ivoirian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel leader (Ayangafac, “Peace” 27).

Why did so many previously negotiated agreements with international support not get implemented? What is different about the OPA? What will each party gain or lose from reunification? This paper will examine the answers to these questions through the lens and actions of each key participant in various stages of the conflict to include: France, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, Burkina Faso, Gbagbo, Soro, and other political parties and FN zone commanders.

This paper will explore the idea that as the political, economic and military status has gradually shifted on the ground, each actor has deftly altered their strategies accordingly, especially Gbagbo. The result of these collective actions was a ‘peaceful’ diplomatic stalemate and deterrence to reunification. The case will be made that although the OPA has positive potential, it mainly preserves Gbagbo and Soro’s political security without guaranteeing reunification and the prevention of future violence. 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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