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	<title>reconciliation &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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	<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress</link>
	<description>Exploring the conduct of international relations and the ideals of democracy &#38; individual liberty in the context of the Christian worldview.</description>
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		<title>Strengths and Weaknesses of Truth Commissions vs. Amnesty Laws as States Recover from the Atrocities of War</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-truth-commissions-vs-amnesty-laws-as-states-recover-from-the-atrocities-of-war/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/strengths-and-weaknesses-of-truth-commissions-vs-amnesty-laws-as-states-recover-from-the-atrocities-of-war/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 13:02:46 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amnesty]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=348</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Truth Commissions (TCs) – TCs may be appointed or sponsored by national, international, NGO, or hybrid commissions (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 156). The strengths of truth commissions may include their low cost, flexibility, “wide range of purposes” that they serve, ability to “reconstitute the moral order and provide a measure of justice when trials are not an option,” usefulness in dealing with “disappearances and killings by anonymous death squads,” potential to end a culture of impunity, role in providing a new transitional government “room to maneuver,” and the “emotional therapy” they provide a “traumatized society” (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 159). But are TCs ‘compromise justice’ that actually weaken the ability to make peace?

Hayner’s analysis of 15 recent TCs is useful for delineating their strengths and weaknesses. Hayner notes that in Uganda (1974) the TC had “little impact on the practices of the Amin regime” (612); in Bolivia many abuses “were overlooked” (614); the Uruguay TC was “not a serious undertaking of human rights” (616); the Zimbabwe report “has never been available to the public” (617); the Chilean report resulted in a formal apology by the President and many recommendations being implemented (622). Furthermore, the Chad TC may have been established “to improve the new president’s image” and suffered from lack of funds (624-625); the El Salvador TC resulted in general amnesty only five days after publication of its report (629); and the South African ANC II report denied any “systematic policy of abuse” (633).]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">348</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 21:43:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[External actors such as international organizations (IOs), regional alliances (RAs), individual states, multinational forces (MNFs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly intervened in fragile and failed states in postconflict scenarios following the end of the Cold War. The nation/state-building processes (NSB) implemented by these actors to rebuild the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89) attempt to strike a reasonable balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in their efforts to rehabilitate security, political, economic and social institutions as well as establish a sense of common identity among citizens (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 175). 

This essay will analyze NSB processes around the core pillars of societal reform necessary to prevent a return to violence in context to the following points of emphasis:

(1)	 What types of challenges do the above-listed outside actors face in striking the balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in NSB processes?

(2)	What division of labor among IOs, RAs, states and NGOs is likely to prove most effective in meeting such challenges in the future and why? 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">327</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Zero Problems &#8211; Enhancing Security and Preventing Conflict in Turkey’s Evolving Partnerships with the European Union, United States, Middle East, Russia and Eurasia</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/zero-problems-enhancing-security-and-preventing-conflict-in-turkeys-evolving-partnerships-with-the-european-union-united-states-middle-east-russia-and-eurasia/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 17:55:01 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=290</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Turkey’s security partnerships with Europe, NATO and the United States have played an important role in its foreign policy decisions since the 1950’s as a counter to Russia during the Cold War (CountryWatch, “Political History”). Founded on the principles of “secularism, strong nationalism, statism, and to a degree, western orientation” by Mustafa Kemal after the collapse of the 600-year old Ottoman Empire (U.S. State Dept., Background Note), Turkey is uniquely positioned at the crossroads and nexus of “four areas of growing strategic importance in the post-Cold War era” (Larrabee 3): the Balkans and Europe, the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, and the Caucasus/Central Asia region. 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the onset of two Persian Gulf Wars, Turkey’s interests and strategic alliances began to markedly shift their trajectories (Larrabee 6-9). This paper will explore Turkey's recent modifications of its strategic security partnerships from the perspectives of key states within each of its regional spheres of influence in a context of conflict prevention. Section One will review the Balkans and European perspective; in Section Two the Middle East; Eurasia and the Caucasus in Section Three with a special slant on Russia; and in Section Four the United States. Section Five will review Turkey’s internal domestic issues to include the Kurdish challenge, political trends, global aspirations and some interesting comparisons with China. The paper will conclude with Section Six and some recommended conflict prevention strategies to counterbalance Turkey’s various threats. 

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. 
]]></description>
		
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