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	<title>United Nations &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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	<description>Exploring the conduct of international relations and the ideals of democracy &#38; individual liberty in the context of the Christian worldview.</description>
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		<title>Reflections on the Israel-Hamas Conflict in Gaza and Stray Voltage on Genocide, Proportionality, Apartheid, Collective Punishment, and the Impact of the (Demise of) the Right of Conquest  </title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/reflections-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict-in-gaza-and-stray-voltage-on-genocide-proportionality-apartheid-legality-of-settlements-and-the-demise-of-the-right-of-conquest/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/reflections-on-the-israel-hamas-conflict-in-gaza-and-stray-voltage-on-genocide-proportionality-apartheid-legality-of-settlements-and-the-demise-of-the-right-of-conquest/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[admin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Nov 2023 07:10:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Human Rights & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intl Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[apartheid]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=909</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Disclaimer: The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of my employer, the Department of Defense (DoD),]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">909</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/competing-visions-for-u-s-grand-strategy/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/competing-visions-for-u-s-grand-strategy/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2015 14:06:16 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Security]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[grand strategy]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=715</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[What are the competing visions for a U.S. grand strategy, their objectives, premises and preferred instruments? Robert J. Art lays out eight possible grand strategies for consideration: Dominion, Global Collective Security;]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">715</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Why the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine Is Incompatible with the Principles of National Sovereignty and Domestic Jurisdiction Found in International Law</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/why-the-responsibility-to-protect-r2p-doctrine-is-incompatible-with-the-principles-of-national-sovereignty-and-domestic-jurisdiction-found-in-international-law/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2013 00:23:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Christian Perspective]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=390</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In the aftermath of unresponsive and slow reactions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to serious humanitarian catastrophes in Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, the British Foreign Office and a Canadian independent commission submitted proposals to UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan, in 1999 and 2001 respectively, arguing for a limited right of military and humanitarian intervention under certain conditions to protect civilians from mass atrocities (Byers 104). Over the past ten years, an emerging norm and set of principles known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has surfaced based upon the idea that “sovereignty is not a prerogative but a responsibility” (Axworthy qtd. in Byers 106).
   
But is R2P intervention legal? Does it violate national sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction? Does it lead to selective authorizations for intervention by the UNSC? Could it lead to inappropriate and unnecessary humanitarian interventions that do more harm than good? This research paper seeks to answer the above questions in the affirmative and establish the principle that R2P is illegal based on the basic principles of national sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction found in international law. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">390</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Key Differences between First and Second Generation Human Rights</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/the-critical-differences-between-first-and-second-generation-human-rights/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/the-critical-differences-between-first-and-second-generation-human-rights/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 18:39:53 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Human Rights & Conflict]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=361</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The recognition of individual human rights under international law took on a “formal and authoritative expression” following the end of World War II when the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 (Steiner, Alston &#038; Goodman (SAG) 134). The UNDHR was designed to “take the form of a declaration – that is, a recommendation by the General Assembly to Member States that would exert a moral and political influence on states rather than constitute a legally binding document” (SAG 135). 

	Following approval of the UDHR, the UN Commission, General Assembly and Third Committee began work on a more “detailed and comprehensive” expression of human rights that emerged in the form of “two principal treaties – The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)” which were both approved in 1966 and both entered into force in 1976 through the required number of ratifications (SAG 136). The ICCPR and ICESCR were designed to be more legally binding than the UDHR. Collectively, these three documents are often referred to as the ‘International Bill of Human Rights’ (SAG 133). 
	
While the ICCPR and ICESCR are said by the Vienna Conference (1993) to be “universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated” (263), there is not universal agreement that the two sets of rights are in fact universal or that they are of equal political and moral weight. The complete set of rights was split into two documents for a reason. With the advent of the Cold War, ideological differences began to emerge over commitments to “first generation” civil and political rights (CPRs) and “second generation” economic and social rights (ESRs) (SAG 136). This bifurcation of rights is often challenged by many as an unfair hierarchical categorization, while others may point to CPRs as being an attempt at Western “ideological imperialism” (SAG 140-141). 

This essay will explore the critical differences between the two documents as well as some similarities. Moreover, the essay will examine the content, application and enforcement characteristics of each document, challenges to enforcement, the nature of each set of rights and their critical differences, and conclude with the assertion that CPRs are more important. 
]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">361</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/natos-role-and-relevance-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-challenges-in-implementing-the-comprehensive-approach/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 14:04:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=352</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) purpose has evolved from one “resolved to unite their [members’] efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security” (NATO “Treaty”), to one of collective security responding to “out of area” conflicts, the organization has become far more than a military alliance. These conflicts have provided NATO the opportunity to engage in both military and non-military aspects of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) in robust peacebuilding operations aimed not only at stabilizing the security situation, but rebuilding the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89).
 
NATO’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to link up military and civilian resources has encountered numerous practical and political challenges, not the least of which has been a lack of adequate resources and uneven burden-sharing amongst its members. “Stated another way, NATO is an alliance … caught up in a myriad of contentious and costly operations that prevent it from appropriately posturing for the 21st century security environment” (Warren 8). 

This paper will explore NATO’s challenges in coordinating the military and civilian aspects of PCR and answer the following questions: Is NATO effective at executing complex civil-military interventions, and secondly, has the alliance found its relevance and purpose?

{The posts, views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces}]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">352</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Challenges Facing Outside Actors in Balancing Punitive and Reconciliatory Measures in Nation/State-Building and the Optimum Division of Labor to Overcome Them</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/challenges-facing-outside-actors-in-balancing-punitive-and-reconciliatory-measures-in-nationstate-building-and-the-optimum-division-of-labor-to-overcome-them/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 21:43:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=327</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[External actors such as international organizations (IOs), regional alliances (RAs), individual states, multinational forces (MNFs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly intervened in fragile and failed states in postconflict scenarios following the end of the Cold War. The nation/state-building processes (NSB) implemented by these actors to rebuild the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89) attempt to strike a reasonable balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in their efforts to rehabilitate security, political, economic and social institutions as well as establish a sense of common identity among citizens (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 175). 

This essay will analyze NSB processes around the core pillars of societal reform necessary to prevent a return to violence in context to the following points of emphasis:

(1)	 What types of challenges do the above-listed outside actors face in striking the balance between punitive and reconciliatory measures in NSB processes?

(2)	What division of labor among IOs, RAs, states and NGOs is likely to prove most effective in meeting such challenges in the future and why? 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">327</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Interconnectedness of Military, Political and Economic Tools in Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Reconstruction</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/the-interconnectedness-of-military-political-and-economic-tools-in-conflict-resolution-and-post-conflict-reconstruction/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/the-interconnectedness-of-military-political-and-economic-tools-in-conflict-resolution-and-post-conflict-reconstruction/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2013 20:22:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Post Conflict Reconstruction]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[and legal reform]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=321</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[For the last twenty years following the end of the Cold War, the nature of conflict has transitioned from mostly interstate conflicts to predominantly intrastate conflicts characterized by a “complex web of social, economic, cultural, political and religious factors” (Bercovitch &#038; Jackson 3). As the context underlying conflict has changed, the approaches to conflict resolution (CR) and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) have adapted as well. Policy-makers have a variety of military, political and economic tools at their disposal to contend with the security, welfare and political representation issues resulting from fragile and failed states. 

This essay will analyze the policy tools available for CR and PCR and in so doing answer the following questions: 

(1)	 To what extent are the political, economic and military tools available to policymakers for use in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction interconnected?

(2)	Has the application of such tools become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War? If so, how and why? If not, why not? 

Section One of the essay will provide a brief summary of how the environment of conflict has changed since the end of the Cold War. Section Two will analyze the military tools. Section Three will cover the political tools, and Section Four will address the economic tools. Section Five will include a brief summary of how these tools are interconnected, but the assertion that they are interconnected will be made in each section of the essay.  

Likewise, the question of whether the application of these tools has become considerably more challenging since the end of the Cold War may be answered in the affirmative with the how and why addressed throughout each section of the paper. Section Six will conclude the paper with a brief summary of the essay. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">321</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken by the International Community to Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paid Content]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Background. Having traced the sources and causes of the conflict, this paper will analyze the steps taken by members of the international community to resolve, contain or prevent the conflict. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since the conflict broke out in September 2002. War fatigue has set in, and the conflict is now less about north versus south and more about who will ultimately control the means of power, security and wealth accumulation after the October 2010 elections. The historic March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) wrested control of the peace process from the international community and put it squarely into the hands of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo and Ivoirian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel leader (Ayangafac, “Peace” 27).

Why did so many previously negotiated agreements with international support not get implemented? What is different about the OPA? What will each party gain or lose from reunification? This paper will examine the answers to these questions through the lens and actions of each key participant in various stages of the conflict to include: France, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, Burkina Faso, Gbagbo, Soro, and other political parties and FN zone commanders.

This paper will explore the idea that as the political, economic and military status has gradually shifted on the ground, each actor has deftly altered their strategies accordingly, especially Gbagbo. The result of these collective actions was a ‘peaceful’ diplomatic stalemate and deterrence to reunification. The case will be made that although the OPA has positive potential, it mainly preserves Gbagbo and Soro’s political security without guaranteeing reunification and the prevention of future violence. 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">281</post-id>	</item>
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		<title>PREVIEW &#8211; Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken By the International Community To Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict-free-preview/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2013 23:46:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=274</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Actions of the Main Actors

France.  After a failed military coup on September 19, 2002, France quickly moved 700 troops into Côte d’Ivoire under a 1961 pact obligating it to defend its former colony from any external invasion (Kohler 31). But France also had 16,000 citizens and 210 subsidiaries of French companies (Kohler 31), in addition to $3.5 billion Euros in direct investment in industries like oil, gas, banking, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications to protect (Busch 52). ]]></description>
		
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		<title>The Last Word on Justice: The Impact of the International Criminal Court On the Future of International Justice and its Rocky Road to Legitimacy</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/the-last-word-on-justice-the-impact-of-the-international-criminal-court-on-the-future-of-international-justice-and-its-rocky-road-to-legitimacy/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Feb 2013 22:03:24 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[“The world no longer has a choice between force and law. If civilization is to survive, it must choose the rule of law.” Dwight D. Eisenhower (qtd. in Ferencz 288)

Introduction

The remarkable ascent of international criminal law over the past two decades has had, and continues to have, a profound impact on the laws of war, humanitarian and human rights laws, and existing international institutions like the United Nations (UN).  The global community took a giant step towards holding the perpetrators of the most serious international crimes accountable to the rule of law by adopting the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998. 

Bringing the violators of these serious crimes to justice, however, has proven to be easier said than done. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has encountered numerous practical and conceptual obstacles in its efforts to become an impartial and effective instrument of justice.  Some commentators like Brett Schafer and Steven Groves believe the ICC is so deeply flawed that it even violates international law in addition to threatening state sovereignty (1). 

The paper seeks to review the history, structure and effectiveness of the ICC, including its recent agreement on a definition for the Crime of Aggression. I will specifically examine practical objections to the ICC, its conceptual challenges, its evolving role in matters of peace and justice, and how it is challenging the traditional role of the UN Security Council (UNSC).   

The ICC’s jurisdictional reach will be examined in detail as well as its procedural safeguards. Finally, I’ll review some ways the United States can effectively cooperate with the ICC as a non-party partner while simultaneously advancing its foreign policy and national security interests and resisting the trend in international law towards pooled sovereignty and global governance. 

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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