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	<title>UNSC &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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	<description>Exploring the conduct of international relations and the ideals of democracy &#38; individual liberty in the context of the Christian worldview.</description>
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		<title>Why the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine Is Incompatible with the Principles of National Sovereignty and Domestic Jurisdiction Found in International Law</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/why-the-responsibility-to-protect-r2p-doctrine-is-incompatible-with-the-principles-of-national-sovereignty-and-domestic-jurisdiction-found-in-international-law/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/why-the-responsibility-to-protect-r2p-doctrine-is-incompatible-with-the-principles-of-national-sovereignty-and-domestic-jurisdiction-found-in-international-law/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2013 00:23:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Christian Perspective]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Human Rights & Conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Gareth Evans]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[human rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[humanitarian catastrophes]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=390</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In the aftermath of unresponsive and slow reactions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to serious humanitarian catastrophes in Kosovo, Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, the British Foreign Office and a Canadian independent commission submitted proposals to UN Secretary General (UNSG) Kofi Annan, in 1999 and 2001 respectively, arguing for a limited right of military and humanitarian intervention under certain conditions to protect civilians from mass atrocities (Byers 104). Over the past ten years, an emerging norm and set of principles known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has surfaced based upon the idea that “sovereignty is not a prerogative but a responsibility” (Axworthy qtd. in Byers 106).
   
But is R2P intervention legal? Does it violate national sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction? Does it lead to selective authorizations for intervention by the UNSC? Could it lead to inappropriate and unnecessary humanitarian interventions that do more harm than good? This research paper seeks to answer the above questions in the affirmative and establish the principle that R2P is illegal based on the basic principles of national sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction found in international law. ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">390</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken by the International Community to Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paid Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amnesty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[arbitration]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Burkina Faso]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[civil war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Compaoré]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict resolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Côte d’Ivoire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DD&R]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[demobilization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diamonds]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomatic stalemate]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Prime Minister Guillaume Soro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rebels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[reunification]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[The Ouagadougou Political Accord]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Background. Having traced the sources and causes of the conflict, this paper will analyze the steps taken by members of the international community to resolve, contain or prevent the conflict. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since the conflict broke out in September 2002. War fatigue has set in, and the conflict is now less about north versus south and more about who will ultimately control the means of power, security and wealth accumulation after the October 2010 elections. The historic March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) wrested control of the peace process from the international community and put it squarely into the hands of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo and Ivoirian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel leader (Ayangafac, “Peace” 27).

Why did so many previously negotiated agreements with international support not get implemented? What is different about the OPA? What will each party gain or lose from reunification? This paper will examine the answers to these questions through the lens and actions of each key participant in various stages of the conflict to include: France, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, Burkina Faso, Gbagbo, Soro, and other political parties and FN zone commanders.

This paper will explore the idea that as the political, economic and military status has gradually shifted on the ground, each actor has deftly altered their strategies accordingly, especially Gbagbo. The result of these collective actions was a ‘peaceful’ diplomatic stalemate and deterrence to reunification. The case will be made that although the OPA has positive potential, it mainly preserves Gbagbo and Soro’s political security without guaranteeing reunification and the prevention of future violence. 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">281</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>PREVIEW &#8211; Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken By the International Community To Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict-free-preview/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict-free-preview/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2013 23:46:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prevent/Contain Intl. Conflicts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Burkina Faso]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[civil war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict resolution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Côte d’Ivoire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crisis]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ECOWAS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FN]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FN Zone Commanders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Forces Nouvelles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FPI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Front Populaire Ivoirian]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Independent Electoral Commission]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International community]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ivory Coast]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Laurent Gbagbo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[OPA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[power sharing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Prime Minister Guillaume Soro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Ouagadougou Political Accord]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UN]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations Security Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UNOCI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UNSC]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[WB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[World Bank]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=274</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Actions of the Main Actors

France.  After a failed military coup on September 19, 2002, France quickly moved 700 troops into Côte d’Ivoire under a 1961 pact obligating it to defend its former colony from any external invasion (Kohler 31). But France also had 16,000 citizens and 210 subsidiaries of French companies (Kohler 31), in addition to $3.5 billion Euros in direct investment in industries like oil, gas, banking, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications to protect (Busch 52). ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">274</post-id>	</item>
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