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	<title>WB &#8211; Kapok Tree Diplomacy</title>
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	<description>Exploring the conduct of international relations and the ideals of democracy &#38; individual liberty in the context of the Christian worldview.</description>
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		<title>NATO’s Role and Relevance in Post-Conflict Reconstruction And Challenges in Implementing the Comprehensive Approach</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/natos-role-and-relevance-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-challenges-in-implementing-the-comprehensive-approach/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/natos-role-and-relevance-in-post-conflict-reconstruction-and-challenges-in-implementing-the-comprehensive-approach/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Feb 2013 14:04:31 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=352</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) purpose has evolved from one “resolved to unite their [members’] efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security” (NATO “Treaty”), to one of collective security responding to “out of area” conflicts, the organization has become far more than a military alliance. These conflicts have provided NATO the opportunity to engage in both military and non-military aspects of post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) in robust peacebuilding operations aimed not only at stabilizing the security situation, but rebuilding the “socioeconomic framework of society … [to include] the framework of governance and rule of law” (Hamre &#038; Sullivan 89).
 
NATO’s ‘comprehensive approach’ to link up military and civilian resources has encountered numerous practical and political challenges, not the least of which has been a lack of adequate resources and uneven burden-sharing amongst its members. “Stated another way, NATO is an alliance … caught up in a myriad of contentious and costly operations that prevent it from appropriately posturing for the 21st century security environment” (Warren 8). 

This paper will explore NATO’s challenges in coordinating the military and civilian aspects of PCR and answer the following questions: Is NATO effective at executing complex civil-military interventions, and secondly, has the alliance found its relevance and purpose?

{The posts, views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces}]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">352</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken by the International Community to Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/</link>
					<comments>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 Feb 2013 00:03:43 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[International Relations]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=281</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Background. Having traced the sources and causes of the conflict, this paper will analyze the steps taken by members of the international community to resolve, contain or prevent the conflict. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire has evolved significantly since the conflict broke out in September 2002. War fatigue has set in, and the conflict is now less about north versus south and more about who will ultimately control the means of power, security and wealth accumulation after the October 2010 elections. The historic March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) wrested control of the peace process from the international community and put it squarely into the hands of Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo and Ivoirian Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, the former Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel leader (Ayangafac, “Peace” 27).

Why did so many previously negotiated agreements with international support not get implemented? What is different about the OPA? What will each party gain or lose from reunification? This paper will examine the answers to these questions through the lens and actions of each key participant in various stages of the conflict to include: France, the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), World Bank, Burkina Faso, Gbagbo, Soro, and other political parties and FN zone commanders.

This paper will explore the idea that as the political, economic and military status has gradually shifted on the ground, each actor has deftly altered their strategies accordingly, especially Gbagbo. The result of these collective actions was a ‘peaceful’ diplomatic stalemate and deterrence to reunification. The case will be made that although the OPA has positive potential, it mainly preserves Gbagbo and Soro’s political security without guaranteeing reunification and the prevention of future violence. 

The posts, views and opinions expressed on this site are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">281</post-id>	</item>
		<item>
		<title>PREVIEW &#8211; Civil War and Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire –  An Analysis of the Steps Taken By the International Community To Prevent, Manage and Resolve the Conflict</title>
		<link>https://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/civil-war-and-crisis-in-cote-divoire-an-analysis-of-the-steps-taken-by-the-international-community-to-prevent-manage-and-resolve-the-conflict-free-preview/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[truepath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Feb 2013 23:46:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Free Content]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://kapoktreediplomacy.com/hp_wordpress/?p=274</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Actions of the Main Actors

France.  After a failed military coup on September 19, 2002, France quickly moved 700 troops into Côte d’Ivoire under a 1961 pact obligating it to defend its former colony from any external invasion (Kohler 31). But France also had 16,000 citizens and 210 subsidiaries of French companies (Kohler 31), in addition to $3.5 billion Euros in direct investment in industries like oil, gas, banking, pharmaceuticals and telecommunications to protect (Busch 52). ]]></description>
		
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		<post-id xmlns="com-wordpress:feed-additions:1">274</post-id>	</item>
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