“The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa \u2013 Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order?” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy<\/p>\n
PREVIEW \u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong><\/em>includes a Table of Contents. Complete essay is 5,920 words, 20 pages double-spaced, 29 references. Kapok Tree Diplomacy. May 2010. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n Table of Contents<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0 Period Summaries of Growing China-Africa Partnership<\/p>\n A.\u00a0 Period of 1950 \u2013 1989<\/p>\n B.\u00a0 Period of 1990 \u2013 1999<\/p>\n C.\u00a0 Period of 2000 to the Present<\/p>\n II.\u00a0 China\u2019s Mercantilist Intentions<\/p>\n A.\u00a0 State Capitalism<\/p>\n B.\u00a0 Trade Ownership Export Strategy<\/p>\n C.\u00a0 Application of the Beijing Consensus in Africa<\/p>\n D.\u00a0 Soft Power<\/p>\n E.\u00a0 National Security<\/p>\n F.\u00a0 Beijing\u2019s New World Order<\/p>\n III.\u00a0 Problems with Peaceful Coexistence \u2013 Resistance and Contradictions<\/p>\n A.\u00a0 African Resistance and Unkept Promises<\/p>\n B.\u00a0 Contradictions with China\u2019s Fulfillment of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence<\/p>\n IV.\u00a0 Conclusions<\/p>\n Kapok Tree Diplomacy 22 May 2010 <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The Genuine Nature of Chinese Intentions in Sub-Saharan Africa \u2013 Peaceful Coexistence or New World Order? <\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This research paper will explore Chinese intentions in sub-Saharan Africa. It will analyze the following topics in context to China\u2019s involvement with Africa: the ideological foundation of the Beijing Consensus; China\u2019s trade and mercantilist development policies; the military and national security aspects of China\u2019s activities; its strategic use of soft power and diplomacy; China\u2019s push for a reconfigured, multi-polar world order, and the implications of this order and policies for Western nations, especially the United States. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n By carefully substituting national economic rights for individual human rights and non- interference over ethics and transparency, China imposes its own brand of neomercantilism and no-strings-attached foreign aid, making sure it obtains substantially more relative gains than Africa despite its constant \u2018win-win\u2019 rhetoric and assertions of equal partnership. The main thesis of this paper is that while China simultaneously and deftly pursues an aggressive geoeconomic and geopolitical strategy that seeks to counter Western global influence by cultivating an attractive, scalable model of strategic partnership in sub-Saharan Africa based on Eastern values of peaceful coexistence and non-interference, the inherent contradictions and values within this strategy undermine democracy, human rights, governmental stability, state sovereignty and long-term economic viability in Africa. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The thread of China\u2019s geo-economic goals of securing important supplies of natural resources to feed its growing economy and enhance its global economic sphere of influence and its geopolitical goals of strengthening its leverage, interests and security within the international order will be explored throughout the paper. The first section will trace the roots of the China- Africa partnership through modern times. The second section will cover the components of China\u2019s complex strategy: state capitalism, a mercantilist export strategy, the Beijing Consensus and foreign policy, soft power, security implications and China\u2019s expressed desire for a new world order. The third section will cover inherent contradictions within China\u2019s strategy as well as African resistance to it. This paper will conclude with the assertion that genuine Chinese intentions are not completely benign, but instead primarily serve national interests and mask realist aspirations for greater power and leadership on a dramatically redefined world stage. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Section One \u2013 Period Summaries of Growing China-Africa Partnership<\/span><\/b> \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Period of 1950 \u2013 1989<\/span><\/i><\/b>. <\/span><\/i>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Kieran Uchehara describes three distinct periods in the growing China- Africa partnership beginning in the 1950\u2019s and 1960\u2019s when China supported several nationalist movements in African states who were striving for independence, followed by China\u2019s procurement of a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and concluding with the recent \u201cliberalization and subsequent growth of the Chinese economy,\u201d especially after the civilian uprising at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (96-97). An important component of the ideological roots of China\u2019s partnership with Africa was solidified during the first phase, South- South cooperation and resistance to Western hegemony. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This ideological thread formally emerged during the Bandung Conference which was held in 1955 and attended by 29 Asian and African nations (Uchehara 96). \u201cColonialism, imperialism and the hegemonic position of the Western powers\u201d were main topics on the economic and cultural agenda (Uchehara 96). It was during this conference that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that would become a major foundation of China\u2019s soft power impetus were adopted by China and Africa: (1) mutual respect for political and economic sovereignty; (2) mutual non-interference in internal affairs; (3) equality and mutual benefit; (4) peaceful resolution of conflicts; and (5) equal and fair representation in world affairs (Mensah 98). Mensah also notes that while China is often lauded for its respect for sovereignty and non- interference, multilateral cooperation with African nations is conditioned by one important principle: adhere to the one China policy and reject official relations with Taiwan \u201cwhich its views as a rogue or renegade province (98). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n China increased diplomatic visits, sold military equipment, and provided some agricultural and medical aid to Africa in the 1970\u2019s and 1980\u2019s, while also constructing some first-class infrastructure projects including the 1,860-km Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) Railway for about $455 million in 1976 (Meidan 74), the largest foreign-aid project China had undertaken to date. Michal Meidan explains that China turned inward in the 1980\u2019s to modernize and beef up its economy to compete with the West, effectively putting Africa on the back burner (74-76). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The events at Tiananmen Square, however, served to turn China\u2019s focus on Africa \u201cfrom one of benign neglect to one of renewed emphasis\u201d as Western nations condemned Chinese Communist Party leadership, whom Naidu et al. asserts were caught \u201coff-guard\u201d and \u201cdemeaned\u201d by the \u201csharp focus on human rights\u201d (89-91). Several African nations had their own issues with human rights abuse and did not want to jeopardize important foreign aid from China although it was declining at the time (Naidu et. al. 91). Africa\u2019s moot response to Tiananmen and China\u2019s presumption of Western interference in its affairs resulted in the perfect storm that strengthened political and economic ties and ignited China\u2019s \u201cdiplomatic charm offensive\u201d in Africa to \u201cpush for a multipolar world order that resisted Western (U.S.) hegemony\u201d (Naidu et. al. 91). The relationship would become more economically pragmatic in the 1990\u2019s while retaining its ideological core. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Period of 1990 \u2013 1999<\/span><\/i><\/b>. <\/span><\/i>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n As China gradually adopted some liberal reforms in its economy in the 1990\u2019s, its GDP grew by an average annual rate of 9.5% annually (Spero and Hart 407) and so did its thirst for oil. The Trade Law Center for Southern Africa (Tralac) reports that bilateral trade between China and Africa grew from $3.9B to $6.5B between 1995 and 1999 and imports of crude oil went from $258M to $875M in that same timeframe, though soaring to $3.6B in 2000 (\u201cTotal Trade\u201d tab, 2010). China\u2019s indigenous sources of oil are stagnant with annual growth of 2% a year versus soaring demand of 10% a year (Meidan 77). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n <\/p>\n With 8% of the world\u2019s oil reserves and 11% of its oil production (Uchehara 104) as well as immense supplies of manganese, cobalt, iron ore, chromium, copper, platinum, nickel, gold and diamonds (<\/span>Tralac, \u201cTotal Trade\u201d tab, 2010), Africa presents an irresistible opportunity for China to meet its growing demands for oil, minerals and other natural resources to fuel its bustling economy. In the first decade of the 21st century, China would cement its African foothold even further. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Period of 2000 to the Present<\/span><\/i><\/b>. <\/span><\/i>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Using a combination of state and public diplomacy, China has enhanced cooperation and dialogue with Africa beginning with the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, a summit of high level governmental officials and business leaders that meet every three years, alternating between sites in China and Africa, and providing a highly visible platform for stating and coordinating China\u2019s policy towards Africa (Shinn 44). President Hu Jintao has used this forum to consistently reiterate China\u2019s <\/span>African policy of economic and diplomatic relationship which is delineated in an official white paper from the 3rd Ministerial Summit in 2006 (Beijing, People’s Republic of China, 2006). China also flexes its diplomatic muscles with numerous high-level visits to the continent. Hu Jintao has visited Africa four times, and Premier Wen Jiabao \u201chas been a frequent visitor to Africa\u201d over the past ten years (Shinn 45). Jonathan Holslag notes that every visitor from Beijing brings promises of economic cooperation on some level (2006: 144). China usually delivers.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Bilateral trade with Africa rose astronomically from 2000 to 2009 according to Tralac statistics, going from $10.6B in 2000, to $39.8B in 2005, then $55.4B in 2006, $73.5B in 2007 and $106.7B in 2008 (\u201cTotal Trade\u201d tab, 2010). Tralac stats also show that over 84% of Chinese imports from Africa are oil and minerals, with precious stones and wood accounting for about 6% (\u201cGraphs\u201d tab, 2010). Additionally, the annual value of Chinese oil imports from Africa have gone from $3.6B in 2000 to a high of $38.8B in 2008 (Tralac,\u201cGraphs\u201d tab, 2010). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n These prodigious increases in bilateral trade have been accompanied by other projections of economic clout by China to include its \u201cGoing Out\u201d strategy, where the state encourages \u201cits corporate sector to transform into multinational companies and invest overseas\u201d to produce \u201cnational champions\u201d that can compete globally (Naidu et. al. 94). This has resulted in more than 800 Chinese telecommunications, infrastructure, energy, medical, oil and other entrepreneurial companies operating in sub-Saharan countries (Naidu et. al. 94), as well as a growing Chinese community in Africa of over 750,000 (Mensah 101). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The first decade of the 21<\/span>st<\/span> century was marked by numerous and substantial Chinese investments in Africa, especially in infrastructure. For example, China maintains loans of approximately $5B to Angola (paid with oil) and $2B to Nigeria for oil interests, while the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) purchased a 45% stake in Nigerian offshore oil fields for $2.27B (Bello 25). Interestingly, in 2009 total China-Africa trade dropped to $90B from $106B in 2008, but China\u2019s exports to Africa only dropped from $50.9B to $47.7B while its imports from Africa dropped from $55.8B to $42.2B forcing Africa to absorb the bigger hit in the global recession, not exactly a win-win scenario (Tralac,\u201cGraphs\u201d tab, 2010). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Naidu et al. indicate that China has invested $350M in Zambian mining (98), $150M in Ghana for telecommunications (98), $1B in Guinea for hydro power (99), $3B in Gabon for hydroelectricity (99), and bought a 20% stake in the South Africa\u2019s Standard Bank for $5.6B (98). Howard French reports that China recently inked a $6B deal in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) to build mines, railways, schools, roads, clinics and hospitals in exchange for \u201calmost 11 million tons of copper and 620,000 tons of cobalt, which it will extract over the next 25 years\u201d (2010). Building factories takes resources, and China is hunting them down. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n These \u201cresources for infrastructure\u201d swaps are not without controversy. David Shinn points out, \u201cMost Chinese assistance to Africa is in the form of low-interest loans \u2026 and often based on repayment by exporting oil or minerals to China, they [therefore] constitute a barter agreement rather than aid\u201d (45-46). These barter agreements also lack the transparency and accountability associated with conventional loans. They can also create hostility and reinforce oppression by autocratic governments. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n A prominent Congolese lawyer responded to the $6B DROC deal by saying, \u201cSix billion dollars in infrastructure is not development \u2026 The Chinese are not even making use of Congolese talent. They hire laborers, and that\u2019s it \u2026 When they pack up and go, the Congo will be left with nothing, not even an upgrade in our human resources. Our earth will be dug up, emptied, and left that way\u201d (French 2010). Asia News had similar sentiments regarding China\u2019s recent $7B mining deal between the state sponsored China International Fund (CIF) and Guinea, describing it as \u201ceconomic colonization,\u201d having being signed \u201cdespite strong protests by the local population that a Chinese invasion might affect local markets and reinforce the dictatorship\u201d (2009). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Certainly many more pages could be written to detail the numerous and troubling economic exchanges between China and Africa. At this juncture, however, I would like to pose the question of why, other than to feed the titanic appetite of its resource hungry economy, is China in Africa? What is the Communist Party of China\u2019s (CPC) political strategy? Do they truly want to create a new world order? The next section of this paper will answer these questions by comprehensively analyzing and assessing the important features of China\u2019s Africa Policy to include its mercantilist model of state capitalism and specific Chinese statements about a new world order based upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Section Two \u2013 China\u2019s Mercantilist Intentions <\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n State Capitalism<\/span><\/i><\/b>.<\/span><\/b> \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n When you take realist IR theory and place it in context to International Political Economy (IPE), you have the essence of mercantilism. In realist theory, the group is the fundamental unit of political analysis\u201d with \u201cthe state as the legitimate representative of the people\u201d (Dunne and Schmidt 93) in a competitive and anarchic system where states are driven to \u201csimultaneously pursue wealth and national power\u201d under the principle of self-help (Gilpin 425). Mercantilism focuses on the accumulation of \u201cnational economic wealth and, in turn, national power by expanding exports and limiting imports\u201d (Spero and Hart 461). In China\u2019s case, the CCP is doing exactly that \u2013 pursuing wealth, power and influence by expanding exports and limiting imports in an odd mixture of state capitalism. Against this mercantilist backdrop, Africa\u2019s oil and natural resources are merely a means to an end. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n With respect to Beijing\u2019s well-conceived, expansionist strategy, Holsag observes: \u201cThe core thesis of mercantilism is that governments should maintain a pivotal role in the development of a strong national economy: Strong state, strong economy\u201d (2006: 135). China employs some level of free market capitalism to attract foreign direct investment and \u201cgain access to overseas consumer markets,\u201d yet \u201cthe state plays a vital role in mooring the accumulated wealth and creating a well-off society through guidance and redistribution\u201d (Holslag 2006: 136). James Fallows describes this mercantilist perspective as being economically more in tune with Friedrich List than Adam Smith, noting that governments ought to deliberately back certain \u2018high potential\u2019 industrial sectors in order to deliberately focus on production over consumption and national wealth over individual wealth (66-70). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Holslag links China\u2019s investment activities, joint ventures, transactions financed through the state-owned Export and Import Bank, business-to-business contacts, cultural cooperation and even development aid itself to its <\/span>state-guided <\/span><\/i>form of capitalism which flows through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (2006: 151-152). Scott Horton cleverly links this state capitalism model back to African oil. He says, \u201cNational oil companies now control three quarters of the world\u2019s crude-oil reserves \u2026 the state is using markets to create wealth that can be directed as political officials see fit. The ultimate motive is not economic (maximizing growth) but political (maximizing the state\u2019s power and the leadership\u2019s chances of survival)\u201d (2010). China\u2019s pursuit of sub-Saharan oil through SOEs gives its ruling party plenty of political leverage and legitimacy. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Spero and Hart point out that the top five multinational corporations \u2013 Wal-Mart, Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP and General Motors \u2013 have $352B, $347B, $319B, $274B and $207B in assets respectively (131). Many of these assets are tied up in real estate, heavy industrial equipment, land, and other hard assets. The cash assets are significantly smaller. China by contrast has, according to the IMF, $2.5 trillion dollars in foreign reserves as of March 2010 (2010). It also has a huge military with tanks, weapons, aircraft, etc. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Wal-Mart, Exxon and GM do not have a military, and they are not SOEs. My point is to underscore the power of this form of state capitalism. When a Chinese SOE goes to negotiate a natural resources deal in Africa, they have the economic might of $2.5T dollars and the political\/military might of the Chinese government at their disposal. The leveraging power is enormous. It\u2019s not about a level playing field or noble morality for the Chinese; it\u2019s about winning and power. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Horton adds, \u201cState-owned companies don\u2019t answer to shareholders; they answer to political bureaucrats. And they don\u2019t face the same level of domestic media scrutiny that a Western multinational will. Both these factors help state-owned companies make deals in secret, deals that multinationals are in no position to make\u201d (2010). The model fits sub-Saharan Africa perfectly where China\u2019s promulgation of non-interference and support of state sovereignty matches up well with many of these weak, rogue governments. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n It also serves a competitive purpose that undermines the Western system of transparency. Horton concludes, \u201cBeyond tilting the commercial playing field away from privately owned companies, this secrecy also helps a government like Guinea\u2019s make the deals that raise the cash that helps the elite hang on to power\u201d (2010). This Chinese style of mercantilism in Africa also plays into its export strategy. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Trade Ownership Export Strategy<\/span><\/i><\/b> \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Holslag notes that China wants to boost trade-ownership in order to \u201cestablish a group of overseas productions bases to boost its transfer of matured industries to overseas and the export of raw materials, equipment and spare parts\u201d (2006: 138). Thus, Chinese ownership stakes in oil companies and exploration projects in African countries like Sudan, Nigeria, Angola and the DROC (Bello 25; French 2010) serve multiple purposes. Holslag suggests that this \u201ccontrol-over-the-well\u201d strategy allows China greater ability to control commodity prices, inflation, and long-term production quotas without the pressures of being beholden to foreign interests and free market fluctuations (2006: 141-143). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Secondly, Chinese ownership of up-stream resource excavation activities allows China to diversify supply lines and dictate terms to weaker, cash-starved governments in areas where there is little competition (Holslag 2006: 143). Lastly, owning productions bases in Africa allows the Chinese to develop the surrounding areas as Special Economic Zones (SEZ) that may present attractive export markets for Chinese textiles, clothing and other retail items (Mensah 100). This begs the question of whether China\u2019s growing influence in Africa is purely for mutual benefit and equal participation in world affairs, or exploitative in a way that merely furthers China\u2019s long-term strategic interests and desire to lead a new world order. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Application of the Beijing Consensus in Africa<\/span><\/i><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This particular ideological way of thinking about the social and economic aspects of the developing world has been characterized by Western academic\/journalist Joshua Cooper Ramo as the \u2018Beijing Consensus\u2019 (Cheow 2006). Mensah explains that China wants to move its relationship with Africa to a \u201cnew level\u201d from the one based on \u201cChina\u2019s growing need for natural resources\u201d to one based upon mutual exchange or \u201canti-colonial brothers-in-arms to economic and trade partners, based on market principles\u201d (99). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n This deliberate shift in strategy marked a clear contrast between the neoliberal Washington Consensus (WC) built upon \u201ceconomic competition, political democracy and social liberalism\u201d (Cheow 2006) and a new, Asian consensus built upon skepticism of privatization and free trade (Lum et al. CRS-9) and \u201cdevelopmental economics, social and economic changes\u201d (Cheow 2006). According to Lum et al., \u201cThe essence of the consensus is that China, India, and other countries that ignored the WC have succeeded while those who followed American advice or underwent World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) discipline have failed in many of their basic goals \u2014 such as lifting their populations out of poverty\u201d (CRS-9). Thus, China has abandoned the WC model in favor of a model stressing \u201cgrowth-based stability, development and reform (in that order)\u201d (Cheow 2006). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Lum describes the Beijing Consensus (BC) as having three principles: \u201cuse of innovation and cutting edge technology to create change that moves faster than the problems that change creates; management of chaos caused by change; and self-determination or using leverage to hold away larger powers that may be tempted to tread on your toes\u201d (CRS-10). China can effectively position this approach using a combination of hard and soft power as a friendlier, equitable, sustainable and less paternalistic approach to developmental aid (Mensah 100). Lum et al. concur: \u201cRather than taking funding from the World Bank or IMF, they can simply \u201creceive\u201d Chinese aid with no strings attached (CRS-10). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The third principle of the BC regarding leverage offers African nations an opportunity to join China\u2019s South-South solidarity and provide these smaller states with a more powerful voice in international affairs. Mensah asserts, \u201cBC rejects the notion of hierarchy of nations that is embodied in the International Financial Institutions\u201d (100), but one wonders if China really believes in a non-hierarchal, Asian order or rather one directed and controlled by themselves? At any rate, China is demonstrating that they do not wish to leave their future to the whims of the market, and soft power is one effective tool they are using to woo African nations to their side. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Soft Power<\/span><\/i><\/b> \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The strategic use of soft power is a primary mechanism that China uses to project leadership in Africa and its role as leader of the developing world. The white paper entitled \u201cChina\u2019s Africa Policy\u201d and produced by the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) government asserts that China is the \u201clargest developing country in the world\u201d to its African audience, and that it will strive for peace, development and stability with the African continent which has the \u201clargest number of developing countries\u201d (PRC, \u201cForeward\u201d, 2006). To that end, the white paper lays out specific focal points of \u201cwin-win\u201d cooperation in the political, economic, educational, cultural and security spheres (PRC, \u201cPart IV\u201d, 2006). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Dennis Tull notes that by using soft power, China\u2019s leadership has adopted \u201ca more active foreign policy as the best strategy to defend and assert its national interests\u201d (462). Thomas Lum describes this active projection of soft power in Africa as \u201cglobal influence attained through diplomatic, economic, cultural and other non-coercive means\u201d (CRS-1). Traditionally, China has outlined its specific soft power initiatives through FOCAC action plans every three years. The 2006 and 2009 actions plans provide some good examples. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In the 2006 Beijing FOCAC Action Plan, China promised \u201ca doubling of aid commitments by 2009,\u201d \u201cestablishment of 3-5 Special Economic Zones,\u201d \u201cprovision of US$3 billion in preferential loans and US$2 billion in preferential buyer\u2019s credits,\u201d \u201ccreation of US$5 billion China-Africa development fund that encourages and supports Chinese companies to invest in Africa,\u201d an \u201cincrease of zero-tariff treatment from 190 to 440 of African products,\u201d a commitment to build 30 hospitals and 100 rural schools, and an \u201cincrease [in] the number of Chinese government scholarships to African students from \u2026 2,000 per year to 4,000 \u2026 by 2009\u201d (Naidu et al. 102). An official in China\u2019s Ministry of Commerce confirms that aid to Africa bring jobs to <\/span>Chinese <\/span><\/i>workers: \u201cthe aid projects provided by the Chinese have provided Chinese companies opportunities to become involved in contractual construction and trade projects\u201d (Naidu et al. 102). The question is whether Africa has equally benefitted. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In the 2009 Sharm El Sheikh FOCAC Action Plan, China pledged to support the African Union (AU) and the New Partnership for Africa\u2019s Development (NEPAD) (PRC, 2.5.1 & 2.5.4, 2009), even though some of NEPAD\u2019s key goals include the support of democracy, transparency and the free press (Tull 476). In other sections of the 2009 action plan, China pledged to help \u201cenlarge the G20 to ensure the fair representation of Africa\u201d (3.2), insist on \u201cincreasing the representation of developing countries, particularly African countries, in the [U.N.] Security Council\u201d (3.3.4), \u201ctrain 2,000 agricultural technicians\u201d (4.1), \u201cincrease the size of the China- Africa Development Fund to US$3 billion\u201d (4.2.3), \u201cprovide US $10B of preferential loans to African countries \u2026 (for) infrastructure\u201d (4.3.3), and \u201ccancel due debts of interest-free government loans \u2026 owed by all heavily-indebted poor \u2026 LDCs in Africa\u201d (5.1.3). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The diversity of these soft power projects is impressive, and the modus operandi of resources-for-infrastructure brilliantly serves China\u2019s interests by allowing Beijing to \u201cdeliberately integrate its resource needs with Africa\u2019s own development requirements\u201d through concessional financing (Naidu et al. 98, 100). Whether it\u2019s an $11.5B aid package to Senegal for \u201csports, cultural and sanitation projects\u201d (Naidu et al. 100), a $1.2B grant to Kenya for a new port (PRC 5\/3\/2010), or a $217M loan for a cement plant in South Africa (AFP News 2010), China\u2019s gracious developmental aid aways has a dual interest of solidifying global influence and support while securing national economic interests. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Dennis Tull explains, \u201cChina conceives its investments as goodwill projects to woo the sympathies of African leaders\u201d (468). Thus, Tull maintains that China is less risk-averse than Western powers, more competitive <\/span>and <\/span><\/i>comfortable with infrastructure projects due to experience and bidding leverage, and not afraid to do business with African nations \u201csuffering from Western-imposed sanctions\u201d (468). The Chinese form of development aid is particularly appealing and effective with high level sub-Saharan African leaders (468). Moreover, it resonates with the BC model of self-determination unbeholden to Western institutions. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n China\u2019s Deputy Foreign Minister, Zhou Wenzhong, implied that non-interference is essential to commerce when commenting on Sudanese infrastructure projects in Khartoum: \u201cBusiness is business. We try to separate politics from business \u2026 we are not able to impose upon them\u201d (Zweig and Jianhai 2005). However, when things got dicey in southern Sudan in 2004, the Chinese were quick to impose 4,000 People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) troops to help guard an important oil pipeline (Brookes & Shin, 2006). Hence, soft power is a means to an end. Transactions between China and sub-Saharan nations \u201cshould be viewed as politically mediated interactions between different nation-states that <\/span>surpass profit maximization<\/span><\/i>\u201d (Holslag 2006: 136). National security and global influence play into the equation as well. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n National Security<\/span><\/i><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Chinese involvement in sub-Saharan Africa serves a dual security purpose ultimately rooted in the principle of self-help. First, Chinese investments in African natural resources, especially oil ventures, helps reduce vulnerability from dependence on other foreign sources like the Middle East or Russia, and decreases the risks of disruption from economic or military crises (Meidan 88). Secondly, Chinese influence on regional issues and the gradual addition of a few (peace-keeping) soldiers on the ground allows the PRC to work intimately with local governments in order to keep an eye on state and local security issues (Holslag 2009: 26). Rather than rely upon African military sources, China is taking the protection of its economic and strategic interests into its own hands. This dual security purpose, however, is confronted by a dual security challenge. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The first security challenge is from African-based threats to Chinese business ventures on the continent. The second security challenge is from external states or even neighboring African states that might get drawn into regional or local conflicts when an opportunity presents itself due to violence and instability. It may be profitable to do business in Africa, but it\u2019s not safe. Holslag affirms, \u201cThe most urgent need for Beijing is the protection of Chinese citizens and companies whenever they fall prey to instability overseas. The long-term risk is that local tensions and conflicts will entice external powers to interfere and to exploit this instability to gain clout at the expense of the People\u2019s Republic\u201d (2009: 27). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The security risks both within and external to African have manifested themselves in diverse ways. Holslag notes that in the past several years Chinese companies have faced the following threats and\/or acts of violence: abduction of workers in Sudan, a car bomb in Nigeria, five deaths at a copper mine in Zambia, the seizure of the Abu Jabra oil field near Darfur, nine deaths in a mysterious oil explosion in Ethiopia, six incidents of piracy off the coast of Somalia, and imminent war between Chad and Sudan over competing oil interests (2009: 25-26). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Bill Gertz of the Washington Times asserts that China is building up its navy and developing close ties with the Burmese military regime to safeguard the Strait of Malacca where 80% of its imported oil comes through (2005), including all African oil which constitutes 30% of its total oil imports (Holslag 2009: 33). Gertz says, \u201cOil-tanker traffic through the Strait, which is closest to Indonesia, is projected to grow from 10 million barrels a day in 2002 to 20 million barrels a day in 2020,\u201d and added, \u201cChinese specialists \u2026 said the United States has the military capability to cut off Chinese oil imports and could “severely cripple” China by blocking its energy supplies\u201d (2005). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n As a result of these internal and external threats to African resources, China has altered its traditional emphasis upon non-interference and sovereignty to one of \u201c<\/span>constructive engagement<\/span><\/i>\u201d aimed at \u201csafeguarding world peace to ensure domestic development\u201d (Holslag 2009: 25). Part of this policy of constructive engagement is participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions. Mensah notes, \u201cChina has contributed a total of over 3,000 personnel \u2026 in 12 U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa\u201d (105), although Chinese support of these operations has tended to be concentrated in countries with significant natural resources such as Sudan, Liberia, Somalia and the DROC (Mensah 105). Such blatant economic nationalism blurs China\u2019s efforts to brand itself as a responsible world power, but they are consistent with China\u2019s desire for a new international order and its economic nationalism. <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Beijing\u2019s New World Order<\/span><\/i><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Mensah quotes Deng\u2019s profound philosophy on foreign policy: \u201cObserve calmly, secure our position, hide our capabilities and bide our time. Be good at maintaining a low profile, never claim leadership\u201d (99). China has certainly done this well with sub-Saharan Africa, but the problem is that it\u2019s getting more difficult to keep the low profile and not look like an emerging hegemony of their own. Tull implies that China\u2019s stated goals in the \u201cAfrican Policy\u201d white paper of reinvigorating South-South cooperation, bolstering leverage in the U.N., promoting multipolarity with flexible alliances, and \u201cestablishing a new international, political and economic order featuring justice, rationality, equality and mutual benefit\u201d (PRC, 2006) are not exactly meant to be hidden and secret from the rest of the world (461). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The focus of this new international order is equality, non-interference and resistance of Western hegemony. Naidu et al. quote former Prime Minister Li Peng in 1990: <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u201c[The] new order of international politics means that all countries are equal and must mutually respect each other . . . regardless of their differences in political systems and ideology. No country is allowed to impose its will on other countries, seek hegemony in any regions, or pursue power politics to deal with other countries. They are not allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of the developing countries or pursue power politics in the name of \u2018human rights, freedom and democracy\u201d (91). <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Commenting on Chinese President Hu Jintao\u2019s 2009 visits to the otherwise nondescript four sub- Saharan African nations of Senegal, Mali, Tanzania and Mauritius, Bright B. Simons concurs in saying, \u201c[this] seems to be a multi-prong diplomatic offensive aimed at <\/span>consolidating<\/span><\/a> some kind of Southern Hemisphere solidarity in anticipation of an era of mercantilist alliances arrayed to the effect of greater multilateralism and the breaking of Euro-American economic hegemony\u201d (2009). But is China\u2019s diplomatic offensive truly benign? Does it really produce mutual benefit? <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n In executing their win-win strategy of aligning sub-Saharan African states\u2019 interests with their own interests using mostly economics, diplomacy and soft power, the Chinese have managed to step on a few toes. Moreover, their policies contain several contradictions to their stated Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The next two sections will review some of the areas of resistance <\/span>to <\/span><\/i>and contradiction <\/span>within <\/span><\/i>China\u2019s \u2018African Policy.\u2019 <\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Section Three \u2013 Problems with Peaceful Coexistence \u2013 Resistance and Contradictions <\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n African Resistance and Unkept Promises<\/span><\/i><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n