“Engaging the Dragon Through Peaceful Deterrence: Japan\u2019s Need to Recalibrate Its Strategy of Accommodation with China” by Kapok Tree Diplomacy<\/p>\n
\u00a9 Kapok Tree Diplomacy. Oct 2012. All rights reserved. Jeff Dwiggins.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n PREVIEW<\/i><\/b><\/span><\/p>\n Theoretical Framework<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n The grand strategies and values of Japan and China will be evaluated from a \u201cBalance of Threat\u201d and \u201cDefensive Realism\u201d theoretical framework.\u00a0 <\/span>This essay posits that given China\u2019s rise and Japan\u2019s moment of opportunity to counter, it is important to gauge the feasibility of a values-based concert of democracies within this theoretical framework. Stephen Walt argues that states tend to balance or bandwagon with a rising power depending on their assessment of the perceived threat.<\/span><\/span>[1]<\/span><\/a> Japan\u2019s past, present and future behavior towards China is thus assessed within the parameters of defensive realism which point to Japanese formation of strategic alliances to deal with the anarchy and security dilemma that characterize the international system and create uncertainty of intentions and inadvertent mistrust and conflict.<\/span>[2]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Background<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n Essay Structure<\/span><\/p>\n The essay consists of four major sections.\u00a0 <\/span><\/span>The first section covers China after a brief explanation of grand strategy, and the second section covers Japan. Each of these sections is broken down into five sub-sections: Grand Strategy, Values, Defense, Diplomacy and Development. The third section is an analysis that compares and contrasts the competing strategies in terms of the four sub-section topics.\u00a0 It includes recommendations for Japan based on the analysis. The final section is a short conclusion. <\/span><\/p>\n Grand Strategy<\/span><\/p>\n In order to assess China and Japan\u2019s grand strategies in terms of the current global and regional conditions it faces, one must first delve into what exactly a grand strategy is and why it\u2019s important. \u00a0<\/span><\/span>Robert J. Art indicates that a grand strategy \u201ctells a nation\u2019s leaders what goals they should aim for and how best they can use their country\u2019s military power to attain those goals.\u201d<\/span>[3]<\/span><\/a> The goals are essentially the national interests.\u00a0 Nuechterlein divides national interests into fundamental, strategic, and private interests, and delineates them by intensity via the categories of survival, vital, major and peripheral.<\/span>[4]<\/span><\/a> This essay is primarily concerned with the core fundamental interests of security\/survival, economic well-being and values. Strategic interests are discussed to the extent that they help achieve the core interests and a preferable world order. <\/span><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span>China<\/span><\/p>\n China\u2019s Grand Strategy <\/span><\/i><\/p>\n From China\u2019s imperial dynasties until the present day era of the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC), and except for a brief period of 1842-1949, sometimes called the \u201cperiod of national humiliation,\u201d one can ascertain some common themes and objectives in China\u2019s grand strategy.<\/span>[5]<\/span><\/a> Swaine and Tellis identify them as the following: (1) Protect and defend national sovereignty and peripheral borders; (2) safeguard and promote internal order and political cohesion; (3) sustain and perpetuate China\u2019s power, influence and peaceful rise within the international order.<\/span>[6]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n Brigadier Subrata Saha notes that China has implemented its grand strategy using a policy of \u201cactive defense\u201d with a combination of coercive and noncoercive methods depending on the issue, its own strength and that of its neighbors and other major powers.<\/span>[7]<\/span><\/a> Saha adds that guanxi<\/em>, the concept of a “reciprocal” and “harmonius world” achieved through layers of “balanced interactions [amongst states]” as well as Confucian and Sun Tzu principles also drive the strategy.\u00a0[8]<\/a>\u00a0 Swaine and Tellis describe this as a “calculative strategy” that compels China to keep a low profile and cultivate support for its policies while quietly expanding its capabilities.\u00a0<\/span>[9]<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n \u00b7<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>Complete essay is 5,522 words; 21 pages double-spaced; 45 references <\/i><\/b><\/b><\/p>\n Table of Contents \u2013 Engaging the Dragon<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n I.\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0Introduction<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0 Topic<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0 Purpose Statement and Hypothesis<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0 Theoretical Framework<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n 1.\u00a0\u00a0 Background<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n 2.\u00a0\u00a0 Essay Structure<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0 Grand Strategy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n II.\u00a0\u00a0China<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0 China\u2019s Grand Strategy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0 China\u2019s Values<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0 China\u2019s Defense Strategy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0 China\u2019s Diplomacy Strategy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0 China\u2019s Development Strategy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n III.\u00a0 Japan<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0 Japan’s Grand Strategy\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0 Japan’s Values\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0 Japan’s Defense Strategy\u00a0\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0 Japan’s Diplomacy Strategy\u00a0 <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n E.\u00a0\u00a0 Japan’s Development Strategy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n IV.\u00a0 Analysis and Recommendations – Engaging the Dragon Through Peaceful Deterrence <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n A.\u00a0\u00a0 Clash of Values<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n B.\u00a0\u00a0 Defense<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n C.\u00a0\u00a0 Diplomacy<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n D.\u00a0\u00a0 Development<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n V.\u00a0\u00a0 Conclusion<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n The posts, views and opinions expressed in this paper are completely my own and do not represent the views or opinions of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of the Navy (DON) or any of the Armed Forces.<\/b><\/span><\/p>\n [1]<\/span><\/a>Walt, Stephen M. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power<\/span><\/i><\/span>. Vol. 9. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985, 3-4, (accessed October 20, 2012), <\/span><\/span>http:\/\/www.christophrohde.de\/waltallianceformationandbop1985.pdf<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n [2]<\/span><\/a> Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. Security Seeking Under Anarchy<\/i><\/span>. Vol. 25. Cambridge, MA: International Security thru The President and Fellows of Harvard College and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Winter 2000\/2001, 1-2, EBSCO Suite, (accessed October 20, 2012). <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n [3]<\/span><\/a> Art, Robert J. A Grand Strategy for America<\/span><\/i><\/span>. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press and The Century Foundation, Inc., 2003, 1-2.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n [4]<\/span><\/a> Nuechterlein, Donald E. America Recommitted: A Superpower Assesses its Role in a Turbulent World<\/i><\/span>. Second edition. Lexington, KY: University of Press of Kentucky, 2001, 15-20. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n [5]<\/span><\/a> Saha, Brigadier Subrata. China’s Grand Strategy: From Confucius to Contemporary<\/i><\/span>. Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, 2010, 2-10, (accessed October 20, 2012), <\/span><\/span>http:\/\/www.dtic.mil\/cgi-bin\/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518303<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n [6]<\/span><\/a> Swaine, Michael D. and Ashley J. Tellis. “Interpreting China\u2019s Grand Strategy.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000, 1-2, (accessed October 20, 2012), <\/span>http:\/\/www.rand.org\/content\/dam\/rand\/pubs\/monograph_reports\/MR1121\/mr1121.ch3.pdf<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n
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