January 30, 2010 – Jeffrey R. Dwiggins, Copyright, Kapok Tree Diplomacy –<\/p>\n
FREE CONTENT<\/strong><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n The Extent That Theories of Cooperation Harmonize With Reality in Contemporary International Relations<\/strong><\/p>\n International relations theorists have presented distinctly different views on both the prospects for cooperation among states and the environmental and structural constraints impeding it for decades. This essay will explain and analyze the main views put forth in Robert Keohane\u2018s Regime and Complex Interdependency Theory, Bruce Russett\u2019s Democratic Peace Theory, David Held\u2019s democratization of global politics, and conclude with Robert Jervis\u2019s ideas on the effectiveness of creating institutions to increase cooperation.<\/p>\n The views of Jervis will bring us full circle with realist and neo-realist views of cooperation. Throughout the essay, I will assess to what extent the arguments of these theorists are convincing. Do these theories of cooperation harmonize with reality in contemporary international relations? The following essay will explain how and why they do, and in other cases how and why they do not.<\/p>\n Theories of Cooperation<\/strong><\/p>\n Keohane – Regimes and Complex Interdependency Theory<\/strong><\/i>. \u00a0Keohane defines cooperation as occurring when \u201cactors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination\u201d (\u201cCooperation\u201d 491). \u00a0The definition leaves some room for why actors would adjust their behavior at all.\u00a0 Keohane implies that the answer is found in mutual interests that are of equal importance (\u201cCooperation\u201d 490). When such mutual interests are present, actors will want to bargain and negotiate as opposed to the manipulation and coercion that prevail under divergent interests and lead to strife.<\/p>\n In contrast, Joseph Grieco states the realist view that \u201cinternational anarchy fosters conflict and competition among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests\u201d (\u201cAnarchy\u201d 485). Grieco points out that liberals have gravitated to institutions to deal with this anarchic restraint (486). We see in Keohane\u2019s theory a potential solution to mitigate the fears of cheating and unequal gains (\u201cPromise\u201d).<\/p>\n Keohane cites Krasner\u2019s definition of regimes as \u201csets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors\u2019 expectations converge in a given area of international relations\u201d (\u201cCooperation\u201d 495). Some examples would include Salt II (security regime), the World Trade Organization (economic regime), and Basel Convention (environmental regime).<\/p>\n Keeohane sees regimes as intermediate variables that can facilitate collaboration and provide a means to deal with predictable patterns of needs brought about by the anarchic system of self-help (\u201cCooperation\u201d 497-500). He asserts that regimes \u201cwill be shaped largely by their most powerful members\u201d (499). This is compatible with structural realism. Although liberals and realists share anarchic assumptions, they differ slightly on their application to regimes. According to Richard Little, realists use regimes mainly for \u201ccoordination\u201d to meet strategic security objectives (306). Little says liberal institutionalists use them more as Keohane envisioned, \u201ccollaborating\u201d and reinforcing the principle of reciprocity with a broader set of objectives that may include commerce or humanitarian goals (304-305).<\/p>\n The theory of complex interdependence goes beyond the concept of regimes by pointing to an intricately woven, asymmetrical framework of mutual dependence among states and non-state actors where \u201cthere are reciprocal, costly effects of transactions\u201d (\u201cComplex\u201d 505) that lead to sources of power other than military power. The sources are defined as \u201ccontrol over resources, or the potential to affect outcomes\u201d (\u201cComplex\u201d 507). \u00a0The OPEC cartel is an example of a non-state actor who controls resources (petroleum) and has the potential to affect outcomes by making significant changes in production.<\/p>\n Keohane and Nye add the concept of \u201cmultiple channels\u201d to their theory such as NGOs (non-governmental organizations), IGOs (inter-governmental organizations) and government agencies, an \u201cabsence of hierarchy among issues\u201d that goes beyond military domination, and a reduced role for the military when complex interdependence is present. He departs from realist assumptions of force being an effective policy instrument and lays out complex processes of agenda formation influenced by non-state actors and a reduced role for military issues when other goals may be reached via collaboration (\u201cComplex\u201d 512-515).<\/p>\n The net result according to Keohane and Nye are effective \u201clinkage strategies\u201d between non-military interests on a domestic or transnational level due to reduced global military threats and the proliferation of \u201ctransnational and transgovernmental relations\u201d that blur the identity and hierarchy of state goals as \u201cnational interests will be defined differently on different issues, at different times, and by different governmental units\u201d (\u201cComplex\u201d 518).<\/p>\n Do Keohane and Nye\u2019s regime and complex interdependency theories comport with reality, and are they convincing? Concerning regimes, I submit that we use the Copenhagen Accord as an example. The regime principle put forth is that reducing greenhouse gas emissions is a good thing for the environment and will diminish global warming. Many nations gathered in Copenhagen to try and secure binding restrictions on emissions. The Accord failed in that respect. Ben Lieberman asserts, \u201cIn fact, all that the Copenhagen accord contains is vague aspirational language to the effect that it would be nice if each country decided on its own to reduce emissions\u201d (\u201cCopenhagen\u201d).<\/p>\n Moreover, it appears that for the United States and China specifically, economic interests prevailed over environmental concerns. The results reflect more of the realist assumptions of competition than Keohane\u2019s collaborative and cooperative assumptions. In other regimes like GATT, collaboration does seem to have worked better, having resulted in the formation of the World Trade Organization (Little 300).<\/p>\n Regarding complex interdependency theory, I would have to agree that there are more channels than ever to work through. More channels mean more diverse agendas driven by more diverse interests. Steven Weber notes that the number of IGOs went from 37 in 1909 to 337 in 1986 (\u201cInstitutions\u201d 231). Susan Strange reports the number of NGOs was over 4,500 by the late 80\u2019s. Additionally, one can see in the United States that issues like health care, the economy, education, immigration and energy issues have shared prominent spots on the national agenda at various times and seasons.<\/p>\n On these issues, Keohane\u2019s principles seem to have merit. However, escalating circumstances in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Yemen seem to suggest that military issues have not been put on the back burner, nor will they anytime soon. The linkage strategies seem plausible, but in reality a state may be more concerned about relative gains made by other states. Grieco confirms this by noting, \u201cCooperation would therefore be unattractive to this state in direct proportion to its belief that the two issue areas were inter-related\u201d (\u201cAnarchy\u201d 506). \u00a0While regimes and complex interdependencies may promote iterative compliance, states may over-rule or side-step regimes when national security is threatened or costs are too high. Contemporary world events suggest that the threat of military force has not abated, though regimes and complex interdependencies have increased.<\/p>\n Russett \u2013 Democratic Peace Theory<\/i><\/strong>. \u00a0In \u201cWhy Democratic Peace?\u201d Russett begins by arguing that transnational and international institutions, geographical distance, alliances, wealth, and political stability do not comprehensively secure peace and deter war on their own (377-383). Russett develops a \u201ccultural\/normative\u201d model based on the \u201cculture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence\u201d (385). Russett points to democratic principles like legitimate rule based upon the consent of the governed, the idea of \u201clive-and-let-live,\u201d and respect for the rule of law that help democracies resolve conflict, while explaining that autocratic nations don\u2019t share these values and tend to resolve conflict with violence (383-387).<\/p>\n Russett reasons that democratic norms and culture will result in violent conflicts being rare \u201cbetween democracies but more frequent between nondemocracies, and between democracies and nondemocracies\u201d (388).<\/p>\n A \u201cstructural\/institutional\u201d model is also developed by Russett based upon additional constraints typical of democracies such as the system of checks and balances, the need to ensure widespread public support for wars, and the extended time needed to filter mobilization decisions and actions through systemic layers (392). Not requiring the consent of the governed or being tied down by similar institutional constraints, the nondemocracy is more nimble and can launch attacks quicker and more efficiently (392). Additionally, Russett indicates that nondemocracies \u201cmay press democracies to make greater concessions,\u201d but democracies may in turn decide in favor of violent conflict than give in to concessions (392).<\/p>\n I find Russett\u2019s arguments to be very convincing when one looks at the most recent wars to include the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the first and second wars in Iraq. All of these wars had a nondemocracy as a major participant. Both the cultural\/normative and structural\/institutional models make compelling cases to reduce the likelihood of war through cooperation. If democracies do not fight each other, it would seem logical to try and build a security community of democratic states, NATO being a good example. Realist assumptions of anarchy and self-help present the challenge that peace cannot be sustained in a world driven by the thirst for power and survival. However, a long-term view that increased democratization can reduce the likelihood of conflict may have merit if the cultural norms and structural principles can be deeply imbedded into newly developing democracies.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Held \u2013 Democratization of Global Politics.<\/strong>\u00a0 <\/i>David Held puts forth the idea of a \u201ccosmopolitan model of democracy\u201d (Dunne 119) that takes into account the increased level of interconnectedness (globalization) in the world. He asserts that people have \u201ccitizenship\u201d in multiple communities to include global, regional, national, state and local, and that certain issues correspond to being handled better in certain communities (28-30). For example, AIDS would be better handled at a global level and local trash pick-up at the city government level. With more communities, you also have more non-state actors.<\/p>\n Because each community realm has their own set of interests, the aggregate interests of nation-states are multi-faceted according to Held, thus requiring a more collaborative and institutional approach to governance (28-30). \u00a0Held prescribes an \u201coverarching democratic framework\u201d that would reform the Security Council of the UN (different veto structure based on multiple interests), create an international human rights court, reform the structure of the UN to make it more democratic, and constitute a new international security force\u00a0 for the \u201cenforcement of regional and global order\u201d (28-30). Held\u2019s new world order <\/i>relies upon the rule of law administered by multilateral institutions, as opposed to unilateral actions, military force and free markets to secure the peace (28-30).<\/p>\n I would agree with Held that the development of new institutions, or the reform of old ones like the UN, must be commensurate to the increasing challenges of globalization and diverse interests of non-state actors. These new collaborative channels provide effective mechanisms for dealing with issues like the environment, economic issues and social justice issues. However, I am skeptical of Held\u2019s cosmopolitan military force being able to effectively intervene in major military conflicts or territorial disputes. Nations are reluctant to spill their own blood unless their own interests are at stake. On the other hand, unilateral military actions might diminish under pressure from a reformed UN Security Council, but its reformation seems unlikely given the reluctance of the five major players to cede control.<\/p>\n Jervis \u2013 Increasing Cooperation Through Institutions<\/i><\/strong>.\u00a0 Jervis assesses the prospects for international cooperation by pointing out that \u201cneoliberalism believes there is much more unrealized<\/i> or potential <\/i>cooperation than does realism, and the schools of thought disagree about how much conflict in world politics is unnecessary <\/i>or avoidable<\/i>\u201d (47). So how might nation-states tap into this unrealized and potential cooperation through institutions?<\/p>\n Firstly, Jervis proposes that institutions represent \u201cbinding and self-binding tools\u201d that make it more costly and problematic to back out of international commitments, thus linking policy and interests in a cooperative context (55). Secondly, Jervis points to the role of institutions as \u201cinnovative tools\u201d that help nation-states resolve current problems based on the ability to learn from and draw upon past knowledge accumulated through iterative use of institutional cooperation (57-58). Thirdly, he suggests that institutions can change preferences over outcomes (58-62). Using NATO and the European Union (EU) as examples, Jervis demonstrates that these institutions took on a \u201clife of their own\u201d in shaping interests by \u201cchanging beliefs about what is possible and desirable\u201d (60) and giving \u201cvoice, legitimacy and forms of influence to weak or new actors\u201d (61).<\/p>\n The arguments put forth by Jervis are convincing on two counts. For one they do harmonize with reality in contemporary international relations. The UN, NATO and EU do act on some level as binding and self-binding tools, innovative tools that have learned from world wars, and interest and preference shaping tools that create incentives. Secondly, they remain viable arguments regardless of theory or structural constraints.<\/p>\n \u00a0Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n Institutions may assist realists with power and goal acquisition, neo-realists with the means to acquire relative gains and move up positionally within the global arrangement, and neoliberals with achieving absolute gains and accounting for non-state actors\u2019 preferences.<\/p>\n Neither structural constraints nor uncertainty over the future should limit the potential for greater international cooperation. Keohane, Russett, Held and Jervis give us plenty of ideas that may unlock unrealized and potential cooperation. While none resolve the threat of violent conflict individually, together they have power to open up cooperative channels of mutual interests, shape preferences, reduce the likelihood of violence and change outcomes.<\/p>\n Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\n Dunne, Tim. “Liberalism.” The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations<\/i>. 4th ed. Ed. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.<\/p>\n Grieco, Joseph. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization<\/i> 42.3 Summer 1988. 485-507. Web. 30 Jan 2010. Academic Search Premier<\/i>. Retrieved at Norwich University Library.<\/p>\n Held, David. “How to Rule the World.” New Statesman<\/i> 126.4349 1997. 28-30. Web. 30 Jan 2010. Academic Search Premier<\/i>. Retrieved at Norwich University Library.<\/p>\n Jervis, Robert. “Realism, Neorealism, and Cooperation.” International Security<\/i> 24.1 Summer 1999. 42-63. Web. 30 Jan 2010. Academic Search Premier<\/i>. Retrieved at Norwich University Library.<\/p>\n Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye. “Complex Interdependence.” Understanding International Relations: The Value of Alternative Lenses<\/i>, 5th<\/sup> ed<\/i>. Ed. Kaufman, Daniel J., et al. United States Military Academy: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2004. Print.<\/p>\n Keohane, Robert O. “Cooperation and International Regimes.” Understanding International Relations: The Value of Alternative Lenses<\/i>, 5th<\/sup> ed<\/i>. Ed. Kaufman, Daniel J., et al. United States Military Academy: The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2004. Print.<\/p>\n —. \u201cThe Promise of Institutional Theory.\u201d International Security<\/i> 20.1 Summer 1995. 45. Web. 30 Jan 2010. Academic Search Premier<\/i>. Retrieved at Norwich University Library.<\/p>\n Lieberman, Ben. “The Copenhagen Conference: A Setback for Bad Climate Policy in 2010.” Issues: Energy and Environment<\/i>. 19 Jan 2010. Heritage Foundation, Web. 30 Jan 2010. <http:\/\/www.heritage.org\/Research\/EnergyandEnvironment\/sr0075.cfm<\/p>\n Little, Richard. \u201cInternational Regimes.\u201d The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations<\/i>. 4th ed. Ed. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.<\/p>\n Russett, Bruce. \u201cWhy Democratic Peace?\u201d The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations<\/i>. 4th ed. Ed. Baylis, John, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.<\/p>\n Weber, Steven. “Institutions and Change.” New Thinking in International Relations Theory<\/i>. Ed. Doyle, Michael W. and G. John Ikenberry. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Print.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" January 30, 2010 – Jeffrey R. 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